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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This is an analytical report for the Community Liaison Unit (CLU), 
'Community Perceptions of Forced Marriage'. This report provides the context, 
explores the problems and the perceptions of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
communities of forced marriages. Therefore, this report represents a 
comprehensive and rigorous synthesis of existing research evidence 
combined with primary data collected specifically for the report.  
 
Chapter One 
Reviews the original aims of the research project and how they will be met by 
this report. It clearly sets out the focus of the research and delineates closely 
related issues that will not be investigated. It considers a variety of 
perspectives, assessing their strengths and weaknesses, and then explains the 
strengths of a multi-dimensional approach and how this can be actualised in 
terms of method. It also discusses the following:- 
• Pros and Cons of Different Approaches 
• Methodology 
• This Research as a Comparative Study 
• Data Collection 
• Limitations of the Research 
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Chapter Two 
Provides the local context within which the two communities are located 
showing that they both are primarily rural in origin, working class, have low 
human capital and a substantial young population. The middle class 
professionals and elderly population are relatively small, both at national and 
local levels. Both groups suffer from a high degree of social stress making 
them dependent on bonding social capital, based in kin networks, to establish 
niches in the labour market. 
• Bradford 
o History of migration 
o Demography 
o Social Stress 
o Employment and Unemployment 
o Education 
• Tower Hamlets 
o Economic and Cultural Background 
o History of Migration 
o Age and Sex Ratios 
o Social Stress: National and Local Data 
o Education 
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Chapter Three 
Examines marriage practices amongst Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
communities within the context of marriage and Britain generally, in among 
minority groups specifically. It provides an overview of endogamous 
marriage practices and examines factors that are salient to understanding 
forced marriages. It evaluates the following: - 
• Marriage 
• Group Boundaries and Marriage 
• Kinship and Marriage 
• Caste 
• Honour 
• Arranged and Love Marriages 
• Trans-continental Marriages 
 
This chapter reviews marriage practices, examining factors for high rates of 
marriage amongst the communities and the phenomenon of endogamy. 
Endogamous marriages are used to reinforce kinship of networks and group 
boundaries and to maintain the cultural distinctiveness of the group and its 
identity. However, both communities are highly diverse and marriage is 
conducted between sub-groups within these communities. Caste hierarchy 
and status are important motivating factors in the arrangements of marriage. 
Arranged marriages are not contracted between individuals but between 
families and families invest in the stability and success of marriages because 
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divorce and separation can result in inter-family feuding. There are various 
forms of arranged marriages and the social class and educational 
backgrounds of parents are closely linked to the degree of choice that is 
offered to children in the arrangement of marriages. 'Traditional' arranged 
marriages are most common amongst the least qualified and the working 
class. Trans-continental marriages are associated with a limited marriage pool 
and the need to find sub-groups of similar status, educational and class 
backgrounds, and will thus persist into the foreseeable future. 
 
Chapter Four 
Examines the causes of and the debates on forced marriages within the 
communities. A detailed examination of the forced marriage issue is followed 
by an analysis of community discussions about it. It discusses the following 
issues: - 
• Forced Marriage - Definition and Numbers 
• Motives of Forced Marriages 
• Debates on Forced Marriages 
• Parental Love, Duty and Reciprocity 
• Denial about Forced Marriages 
• Gender and Ethnicity 
• Honour and Men in the Public Sphere 
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The chapter examines the definition of forced marriage in detail, considers 
various views on the extent of the problem and explores demographic 
explanations for the problem. While the motivations involved in forced 
marriages are complex, the chapter demonstrates that liaisons with the 
opposite sex are an important trigger for instigating the process of forced 
marriage. Communities have become reflective about the issue and realise 
that forced marriages do not work. Divorce, separation and running away 
from home are some of the consequences. The elderly are being forced to 
adjust and adapt in reaction to their children’s demand for greater choice. 
While they want young people to accept their marriage decisions, the elderly 
are aware they cannot force them. Middle-aged participants believe that 
forced marriage will die out because they realise the un-Islamic nature of the 
practice. This group is acutely aware that they need to make pragmatic 
decisions to accommodate the wishes of their children or they will suffer 
dishonour by them running away. The general consensus is that force is 
unacceptable but community understanding of coercion does not include 
emotional and psychological pressure. This issue crops up in delicate 
situations such as inter-religious relations. Women, due to socialisation, are 
important enforcers of patriarchal norms and in many cases are the active 
agents in the process of forced marriages. 
 
 vii
Chapter Five 
Examines generational differences in greater detail. It first defines the 
ambiguity of the categories `generation’ and `youth’ and then explores 
differences between young and old. The main issues covered are: - 
• Religion and Culture 
• Social Change, Parents and Arranged Marriage 
• Trans-continental Marriage 
• Social Class and the Rise of Individualism 
 
Generational differences are clearly emerging in a number of areas. The first 
area is the emergence of linguistic change, mainly among Pakistanis, where 
we are seeing English becoming the main language of communication. The 
young tend to identify themselves as Muslim, although this is truer for 
Pakistanis than Bangladeshis due to their different heritage. This is not an 
example of increasing religiosity but a shift in social identity. The shift is 
reflected in the difference between generations over what are considered to be 
important criteria for matrimony. Elders argue that religious and cultural 
factors should be taken into account, meaning that the person should be from 
the same ethnic group, while young people are saying that only religion is 
important. Marrying outside the ethnic group is acceptable, but marrying 
outside one's religion is unacceptable. Parents recognise the ground reality 
that their children’s expectations of marriage are different, and are being 
forced to become more flexible or face unacceptable situations such as their 
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offspring running away. Trans-continental marriages are another area of 
difference. Young people argued that linguistic and cultural compatibility is 
important and only if appropriate candidates were not found in Britain would 
they look for a partner in South Asia. They do accept the concept of arranged 
marriage, but want a greater degree of choice and show a clear preference for 
marrying someone already living in Britain. For women educational 
compatibility is an important criterion. Young people are concerned also that 
community leaders have not adequately and seriously addressed the issue of 
forced marriage and show little confidence in them. 
 
Chapter Six 
Considers the very strong response from the community about the project 
itself. It covers the following areas: - 
• Race and Islamophobia 
• Immigration 
These issues emerge spontaneously from the focus groups and indicate the 
sensitivity to the topic that was being investigated. The range of opinion was 
strongest amongst the elderly but was still evident among the youth. The 
research was seen as part of a veiled threat against arranged marriages. The 
reaction showed how important it was for policy initiatives to be articulated 
in a sensitive manner, otherwise they would face a hostile community 
rallying around the accusation that the government’s interest in forced 
marriages was an example of racism and Islamophobia. 
 ix
 
Chapter Seven 
Draws together the various findings that were explored and analysed in the 
body of the report and the annex, summarising the main points raised in the 
individual sections. 
 
Annex 1 
Reviews the national demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities within the context of minority ethnic 
groups in general. Providing a national context for the data examined in 
chapter 2, it explores the following: - 
• Spatial Distribution 
• Population Size and Growth Rate 
• Age Structure and Sex Ratio 
• Employment, Unemployment and Self-employment 
• Human Capital. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
 
Azad Free 
Affines Kinship relations arising through marriage 
Biraderi Patrilineal kinship group in the Punjab 
Bonding social capital The social glue that results in strong group 
solidarity such as dense ethnic networks which 
provide crucial social and psychological 
community support. 
Collectivity Any grouping of individuals that brings together 
the actors as a composite unit such as a nation, 
ethnic group or women's group. 
Cross-cousin Father's cousin marrying mother's cousin or visa 
versa. 
Endogamy Marrying within a clan or tribe 
Essentialist Pertaining to an essence of anything or 
representing absolute truths. 
Ethnic Minority Is a term used to denote people of South Asian, 
Black Caribbean and Black African origin. It’s a 
broad umbrella term used deliberately to signify 
reference to a wide variety of minority groups that 
are strictly ethnic. These categories are based on 
the 1991 census. 
Gatekeeper Someone who controls access to information or to 
a particular group. 
Gusthi Patrilineages in Bangladesh 
Haraam Illegal 
Heuristic Any general concept which is framed merely as an 
aid to analysis but not an end in itself. 
Homogamy The selection of a partner from a similar social 
background 
Human capital A person’s educational and social assets  
Izzat Prestige, honour 
Jati Occupational hierarchy 
Khandan Extended family 
Lascar Sailor 
Qaum Tribe or caste 
Salariat White-collar employment 
Sharam Shame 
Umma Islamic community 
Zat/Jaat Caste, former is in Urdu/Punjabi and the latter is 
in Bengali 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The report of the Home Office Working Group on Forced Marriages (A Choice 
by Right 2000), has highlighted a serious but neglected issue. Its remit was to 
probe the extent of forced marriages, engage with relevant service delivery 
agencies, affected communities and relevant non-governmental organisations, 
stimulate public debate to raise awareness and develop a comprehensive 
strategy for tackling this issue including preventative measures (Ibid, 2000: 28).  
 
The Working Group attempted to discover the number of forced marriage cases 
but was unable to produce a definitive figure. This report will not cover the same 
ground. It takes its cue from Baroness Scotland of Asthal’s statement that the key 
to this problem lies within the communities themselves and that the government 
must be guided by these communities (Scotland 2000). However, a better 
understanding of how communities perceive the issue of forced marriages is 
required before strategies for working with them are developed. Our study 
explores the insiders’ views of the issues and we outline the main areas of 
concern raised by different sections within the communities.  
 
While the issue of forced marriages is not restricted to a particular racial, ethnic 
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or religious group, it does seem to be more common where the practice of 
arranged marriage is the norm. As many social scientists have pointed out, in 
many respects the practice of arranged marriage is not very different from 
marriage practices among white people, because the latter still recruit their 
partners from the same nationality, ethnic and racial group, socio-economic 
background and religion. Those who do not conform to these norms, in some 
circumstances, suffer sanctions, ranging from disapproval to ostracism (The 
Bradford Commission Report 1996). It is in this wider social context that 
arranged marriage among South Asian communities needs to be considered.  
 
Contemporary understandings of community no longer accept notions of 
identity as essentialist and unproblematic. Ethnic communities, as many writers 
have argued, are not homogeneous since their members vary according to 
language, religion, gender, generation, social class, sexuality and political 
persuasion (Ranger 1996). To understand this diversity we need to use a much 
more mobile and subtle understanding of community. The same applies to 
discussions of community identity. Identity is a process which is hybrid and 
varies over time, space and place; a process that is always becoming but never 
completed (Hall 1996, Jackson and Penrose 1993). 
 
Pros and Cons of Different Approaches 
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The issue of forced marriage can be approached from a number of theoretical 
perspectives. Different analytical approaches produce results that emphasise a 
particular aspect of the issue. The concern here is that the issues are 
multidimensional and so we need to engage with a number of perspectives. 
 
An ethnic perspective would locate the phenomenon within the wider context of 
arranged marriages, especially endogamous marriages. Forced marriages could, 
therefore, be seen as an extreme extension of endogamy practices and not the 
result of arranged marriages. The difficulty with this approach is the tendency to 
focus on culture or religion to the exclusion of other factors.  
 
Generation is another approach and the study should be alert to the variations 
due to generation that occur within communities. It illuminates inter-
generational debates and discourses that are taking place. The limitation of this 
approach would be that generation has to be triangulated with other factors to 
have explanatory properties. 
 
The perspective of gender is central to the issue of forced marriage, in particular 
the role of women in the reproduction of the community. Women’s membership 
of a collectivity is similar to that of men, and women are active participants in 
community struggles. However women are, generally, the symbols of the 
collectivity while men act to represent it. Ethnic boundaries are often dependant 
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on gender attributes organised around sexuality, marriage and the family. These 
socially constructed markers of ‘honour, purity, the mothering of patriots, 
reproducers of nation, transmitters of ethnic cultures’ make women symbols of 
the collectivity and their reproducers (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992: 113-4, 
Lutz, Phoenix, Yuval Davis 1995:9-10). Hence the heightened sensitivity over 
critical public examination of minority ethnic affairs. The gender approach sees 
forced marriages as symptomatic of wider issues associated with domestic 
violence. It is inextricably associated with control of women, especially their 
sexuality. Critics, however, point out that forced marriages are not only about 
women - they also affect men and gender variations need to be accommodated in 
any heuristic approach. 
 
The fourth perspective examines the issue in terms of social class. Here we need 
to be aware that the relationship between social class and ethnicity is problematic 
and that multiple factors need to be built into the concept of social class (Smith et 
al 2000). If forced marriages are located within the category of domestic violence 
then evidence shows that domestic violence takes place across class lines. Social 
class is an important variable but is not a defining indicator in its own right and 
must be cross-referenced with other variables.  
 
In outlining these possible approaches we confront the problem, which Floya 
Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (1993) elaborated in their influential book 
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Racialized Boundaries. The difficulty of following a single approach, whether it is 
ethnicity, patriarchy or social class, leads to a series of disconnected worlds 
where oppression in one category does not link up with other categories and 
forms of oppression. Clearly, real life experiences of individuals are far more 
complex and each perspective can only explain a part of the general picture. A 
multi-dimensional approach is needed which brings these perspectives together 
so that a more comprehensive analysis can be made which bears a closer 
resemblance to people’s lived experiences. The approach that was adopted for 
the research was to examine the issue of forced marriages from a perspective that 
accommodates ethnicity, gender, generation and social class. 
 
The sensitivity of the research requires that racial, ethnic and religious 
stereotypes do not influence the research methodology, the assumptions of the 
research itself and any policy implications that may emerge from the research. 
Closely linked to these concerns is the public examination of cultural issues that 
are normally kept within the private realm of ethnic communities. Any 
discussion about the policy implications that may emerge to address the issue of 
forced marriage has to consider the sensitivity of the communities whose 
marriage practices are being subjected to public debate. The issue of religion and 
religious discrimination is also involved here. The accusation of Islamophobia 
can be quickly raised because the research focuses on two Muslim communities: 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi. The two issues combine to produce concerns that 
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racial stereotypes are shaping the public debate about forced marriages and the 
policy initiatives that may emerge. It is only through an approach which 
problematises ethnicity and culture as contested terrains, that these concerns can 
be dealt with. Recognition of the internal diversity within communities provides 
the basis for a more refined and nuanced understanding of the complex social 
space occupied by community.  
 
Ideally it would have been preferable to have conducted a study investigating 
forced marriage practices among all minority ethnic communities where cases of 
forced marriages have been registered. Such a study would have covered other 
communities. Here, because of limited time and resources, we could only deal 
with two communities: the Bangladeshi community in Tower Hamlets and the 
Pakistani community in Bradford. These communities were chosen because most 
of the forced marriage cases handled by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
involve women and men from these communities. Although not all members of 
these communities are Muslim, all the cases the FCO handle from these 
communities involve Muslim women and men. Interestingly Islam was brought 
up by the participants in the focus groups as a key issue in the discussion of 
marriage. As a result of this Islam is a central feature of the report. However, the 
report did not set out to conduct a study of marriage in Islam per se. 
 
The report does not deal, therefore, with forced marriages globally and we 
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recognise that further research may be warranted on this issue. Another 
limitation of the research is that we are only able to consider perceptions of the 
people involved in the UK and did not investigate the motives of relatives 
involved in the marriage abroad. Often the arrangement for the wedding is done 
by close relatives in the country of origin and their beliefs may have a bearing on 
the actions of the parents in the UK The research also excluded cases of forced 
marriages which did not involve an overseas marriage.  
 
While there was general agreement over the definition of forced marriage, NGOs 
were frequently unclear as to who should be included in this category. Certain 
cases of domestic violence and forced marriages were conflated. This study 
exclusively focuses on British citizens, brought up in the UK and forced into 
marriages in their parents’ country of origin. We have excluded non-British 
citizen women, who enter the UK as spouses and are then subject to domestic 
violence. The situation of women brought to the UK as spouses and ill-treated by 
in-laws is a cause for concern and worthy of further research but is not the focus 
of this report. 
 
Methodology 
 
A Comparative Study  
This report on forced marriage is based on a comparative study of Pakistanis in 
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Bradford and Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets. We concentrated on these two 
populations and localities because (a) most forced marriage cases handled by 
government involved Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (b) Bradford and Tower 
Hamlets were the heartlands of these two communities.  
 
The comparison was carried out with the intention of revealing the complexities 
of the phenomenon known as forced marriage. These complexities are shaped by 
the interaction between demographic forces, on the one hand, and social, 
cultural, economic and political forces on the other. They involve both 
populations, even though most reports of forced marriage have concerned 
Pakistanis rather than Bangladeshis. In other words, the forced marriage issue is 
not peculiar to one community. We want to show, therefore, the reasons why the 
issue involves both populations as well as the particular ways in which 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis understand the forced marriage issue. In so doing 
we hope to avoid the inherent danger of both playing one people off against 
another and stereotyping them.  
 
Data Collection 
Evidence was collected from a variety of sources. Statistical data was collated 
from various population surveys, both national and local, to establish the key 
demographic changes affecting both communities during the last twenty years. 
Other secondary material was used in order to establish the social, cultural and 
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economic background but the primary data was collected through the focus 
groups in Bradford and Tower Hamlets as well as one to one interviews with 
gatekeepers. These groups were chosen according to age and gender and were 
led by researchers who were fluent in the appropriate South Asian languages as 
well as in English.  
 
The sample of interviewees in each setting consists of the following:  
 
One to one interviews with gatekeepers 20 per site  
Group interviews 24 per site with two sets, one for  
working class and another for 
middle class  
 
Age Men Women 
55+ 2 groups 2 groups 
25-54 2 groups 2 groups 
16-24 2 groups 2 groups 
 
The researchers’ skill in setting up the focus group meetings was vital to the 
project since they had to operate in difficult circumstances given the problems of 
post-Bradford Riots and after the destruction of the Word Trade Centre’s twin 
towers on September 11, 2001. There was increased tension against Muslims and 
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this produced a reluctance to participate in a research project, which was 
perceived as hostile. These problems particularly hampered the research in 
Bradford but, in early 2002, focus group meetings were resumed in both localities 
and the targets achieved.  
 
Limitations of the research 
The researchers were acutely aware that the study may have been perceived as 
intrusion into cultural practices and that perception may have impacted on the 
responses made in the interviews. The view that the research was part of an 
Islamophobic/anti -Muslim government policy was openly voiced by educated 
males. It is possible that this may have led to the downplaying of forced 
marriages in the findings. The team was acutely sensitive to the notion that 
boundaries between insiders and outsiders depend upon both sides perceiving 
differences. Insiders are, therefore, aware of outsiders’ beliefs about their 
distinctiveness as a group and outsiders’ opinions and actions play a part in the 
maintenance of in-group boundaries. 
 
The methodology adopted was to avoid these insider/outsider problems and 
how this may influence answers given by the focus groups. The strategy adopted 
by the research team was to ensure that ethnic and gender matching of the 
researchers conducting the interviews would overcome any potential resistance 
there might have been to speaking openly or critically about forced marriages. 
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Furthermore, the topic guide used in the focus groups initiated discussion by 
looking at the question of marriage as a whole rather than simply asking for 
views on forced marriages.  
 
The focus groups followed a standard format, contextualising the discussions on 
forced marriages within the wider framework of South Asian endogamous 
marriages and how this framework has functioned and changed in Britain. The 
focus groups explored the motives for people marrying and then proceeded to 
discuss particular forms of marriages – arranged, love and forced marriage. 
Participants were encouraged to express their individual views and to reflect on 
various scenarios, which involved situations where young men or women might 
find themselves under pressure to marry. They also spontaneously expressed 
their opinions on a number of issues, such as the interest shown by the 
government and the media in forced marriages. The lively responses from most 
of the focus groups to this format provided a vivid insight into the nuances of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi responses to the forced marriage issue. The voices of 
community members are expressed through numerous quotations and are also 
located within an analytical framework to elucidate their meaning. The 
construction of the analysis was merely an aid to clarify the meaning of 
individual points of views expressed in the group interviews. Thus our analysis 
attempts to represent sociologically the ways in which the groups construct a 
hierarchy of meaning. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
BRADFORD AND TOWER HAMLETS: 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT  
 
Introduction 
 
The demographic and socio-economic context of the Pakistanis in Bradford and 
Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets is explored in this chapter. Both groups share 
many features with other ethnic minorities and are dissimilar in other ways. The 
national characteristics are developed in detail and can be found in Annex 1. 
There is some overlap, with the national figures and the data for the local level 
producing some repeti tion of information. This is unavoidable as it cannot be 
assumed that national characteristics will be reproduced on the local level, since 
some localities show considerable variation from the national trend. The 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities in Bradford and Tower Hamlets are 
representative of the national trend for these two groups. Social-economic issues 
that are examined and illustrated in this chapter influence some of the cultural 
practices, which are discussed later in the report. We argue that, as well as 
culture, demographic and socio-economic factors are important determinants in 
explaining the issue of forced marriage. 
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Bradford 
 
History of migration 
The Bradford Metropolitan District is situated west of Leeds; north of the trans-
Pennine highway. To the north and east lies North Yorkshire, with its manor 
houses, farms and cathedral cities, while to the west and north lies the Lake 
District.  
 
The city has been the centre of the wool trade since the 18th century and, until 
recently, wool dominated the local economy. Even the engineering and chemical 
industries were associated with the wool trade by supplying the needs of the 
textile industry. Throughout the 19th century it was mainly a working class city 
structured around a low wage economy. The global networks, stretching out to 
the colonies, in particular, were constructed around importing wool and 
reprocessing it for export. These networks persisted into the mid-twentieth 
century.  
 
This global movement of commodities was accompanied by the movement of 
labour and a wide range of people, following different religious traditions, 
settled in the city (Bradford Commission 1996). The Irish and Germans migrated 
to the city before the Second World War, followed by Poles, Ukrainians and 
Italians in the 1940s. During the 1950s and 1960s new arrivals came from the 
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New Commonwealth. There has been considerable debate as to the motivations 
of the recent arrivals. The literature is structured around competing theories of 
push and pull factors; the main push factors being the economic and political 
conditions in the country of origin while the pull factors were primarily a 
demand for cheap labour during the post-war period.  
 
Push/pull factors are not the only forces at work, however. Social 
anthropologists have been quick to point to the cultural dimensions which also 
play a role in migration. Chain migration is influenced by the degree of 
community consciousness and, in the case of Mirpuris, this consciousness was 
deeply shaped by their biraderi system.  
 
In Bradford a combination of push and pull factors, combining with cultural 
resources, facilitated the settlement of Pakistanis. It is estimated that 50 per cent 
of Pakistanis in Britain are from Azad Kashmir (Ballard 1991) and most of these 
are from one district in particular – Mirpur – as well as the southern part of Kotli 
district. Azad Kashmiris are culturally and linguistically part of the Punjabi 
heartland but, under colonial rule, they did not benefit in the same way as the 
rest of the Punjab. The Punjab was the Sword Arm of the Empire and provided 
substantial military recruitment to the British Indian Army. Consequently, the 
region was developed so that discontent would not affect the army.  
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What is known as Azad Kashmir today was part of the Princely State of Jammu 
and Kashmir. Princely states were autonomous in their internal affairs and their 
inhabitants were excluded from military recruitment. Mirpuris established 
instead a niche in the engine rooms of the British merchant navy before the 
Second World War. With the outbreak of hostilities many worked in the 
munitions factories in South Shields, establishing a bridgehead which facilitated 
the arrival of their fellow countrymen. New opportunities arose with the acute 
labour shortage after the Second World War and British firms encouraged labour 
migration to fill the vacancies and Mirpuris filled in these gaps. These pioneers 
created the foundation for the process of chain-migration which took place in the 
post-war era. Substantial numbers of Mirpuris called their families and clansmen 
to join them in the United Kingdom. The impetus to migrate was facilitated by 
the construction of the Mangla Dam, since the World Bank financed 
compensation for those whose homes were submerged by the lake which the 
dam created. Many used this compensation to finance their move to Britain. A 
third of a million settled in Britain - half the population of Mirpur's villages - 
resulting in significant flows of remittances back to the villages of origin (Ballard 
1991, Dayha 1974, Saifullah-Khan 1976) 
 
Demography 
The Pakistani demographic profile (figure 2.1) shows a substantial young 
population and a much smaller population of elders, with more males than 
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females.  
 
Figure 2.1: Population for the Bradford District by Age and Ethnic Group 1998 
 
Population 0-4 5-15 16-17 
18-
retired 
Retired-
74 75+ Total 
White 23,600 4,800 9,800 225,950 44,150 31,000 389,250 
Black-
Caribbean 400 1,300 200 3,850 450 100 6,200 
Indian 950 2,400 500 8,650 700 200 13,450 
Pakistani 10,050 16,100 3,050 33,900 2,200 300 65,650 
Bangladeshi  750 1,400 250 2,600 150  5,200 
Other 500 1,850 300 3,800 200 50 6,700 
All groups 36,300 27,900 14,100 278,700 47,800 31,650 486,400 
 
Source: Bradford Council’s Population Forecasts 1991-2001 
Forty-four per cent of the Pakistani population are aged under 17, while barely 4 
per cent are over 65. This population is continuously topped up by a trickle of 
immigration (mostly spouses), estimated between 600 and 700 per year (Simpson 
1997) 
The ethnic minorities of Bradford are concentrated in the `inner city’. The 
definition of the inner city, as pointed out by the Bradford Commission (1996), is 
highly ambiguous and different official bodies use different criteria, reflecting 
their specific responsibilities. The Police, Education, Health, Social Services and 
voluntary bodies work with different boundaries, influenced by different 
funding formulas, institutional structures and their prioritisations of certain 
issues and interests. Temporal and social change also influences the way the 
inner city is constructed: 
 
Some official publications classify the inner city in Bradford as 
composed of five electoral wards and the outer city as composed of 
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some 15 wards, on the basis of demographic trends … Although 
inner city Bradford, defined in this way, is often portrayed as an 
area inhabited predominantly by Pakistanis, the majority of 
residents are White (Bradford Commission 1996). 
 
Most ethnic minority citizens are concentrated in the inner city and in five wards 
in particular - Heaton, Toller, University, Little Horton and Bradford Moor - 
which have 20 per cent or more of their population belonging to ethnic minority 
groups. The highest concentrations of Pakistanis are found in Toller, University, 
Little Horton and Heaton, and they dominate the inner city outnumbering all the 
other ethnic minorities. Bradford Moor and Toller wards have over fifty per cent 
of their population from the Pakistani community, while University ward 
contains over seventy per cent (OPCS 1993). 
 
Social Stress 
According to the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
Index of Local Deprivation Bradford is ranked 64th out of 354 districts in the 
country and Little Horton ward was the 42nd most deprived in the country 
(DETR 2000, 2000a). The Bradford Metropolitan Council survey reveals that out 
of the 11 wards in the district showing high measures of multiple stress three of 
them, Manningham, Girlington and West Bowling wards, contained high 
proportions of Pakistanis (BDEIS 1995: 50). 
 
Employment and Unemployment 
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The transformation of the economy, particularly due to de-industrialisation, has 
been a major cause for concern. Between 1961 and 1991 the labour market rapidly 
contracted resulting in the loss of 31,600 jobs. In 1961 just under 60 per cent of 
employment, representing 127,400 jobs, was in manufacturing, while 35.5 per 
cent or 75,700 jobs were in the service sector. In 1991 this position was reversed 
with the service sector employing just under 68 per cent or 122,500 jobs and 
manufacturing employing around 27 per cent or 49,700 jobs. Mechanical 
engineering and textiles continued to downsize but there has been growth in the 
electronic, chemical and printing sectors (BDEIS 1995: 19).  
 
The 1991 Census showed unemployment among Pakistani males at over 35 per 
cent and fractionally higher among Pakistani women. Only Bangladeshi males 
came close to these rates of unemployment. Pakistani male unemployment was 
nearly three times higher than White male unemployment and nearly six times 
higher than White female unemployment (OPCS 1993). The Bradford 
Commission noted that '700 or 1,000 new jobs per year were needed to maintain 
current levels of employment, and many more if unemployment was to 
disappear' (1996). The situation in 1998 improved with unemployment among 
Pakistanis falling to 21 per cent but this was still considerably higher than the 
White unemployment rate of just over 5 per cent (BDPIS). What is particularly 
worrying is that youth unemployment is just as high and also has a strong ethnic 
bias. Unemployment among Pakistani young men is more than twice as high as 
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it is for young Whites. In 1999 youth unemployment in University ward was 
estimated to be as high as 20 per cent (BDPIS a).  
 
Education 
The OFSTED report on Bradford (2000) is critical of the LEA for serving the 
district so poorly. It blames poor leadership, political and professional, as the 
primary cause. At Key Stage 2 44 out of the 59 middle schools were below 
benchmark standards. At Key stage 3 the difference from the national average 
narrows, but the percentage of students attaining five or more subjects A*-C is 
32.3 per cent compared to the nationals standard of 46.3 per cent. 
Underperformance among Pakistani boys, whose pass rate (at the level of 5 
GCSEs at grades A-C) is 17 per cent is even more worrying. 
 
Tower Hamlets 
 
Economic and Cultural Background 
Bradford and Tower Hamlets have a lot in common socially and economically. 
Tower Hamlets also has a long history of immigration shaped by periodic waves 
of overseas settlers – French Protestants during the late 17th century, Irish 
Catholics in the 18th and 19th centuries, Polish and Russian Jews in the late 19th 
century, and more recently Maltese, Cypriot, Somali and Bangladeshi arrivals. 
These newcomers usually found work in the small industries and retail outlets 
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north of the docks. Bangladeshis were the latest immigrants to revive the 
garment industry and to create an ethnic enclave of small shops, cafes, 
restaurants, taxi companies and travel agencies.  
 
During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the garment industry’s fortunes declined 
while a second and third generation of Bangladeshis has emerged eager to find 
work outside the ethnic niche created by their elders. New opportunities have 
been created by the dramatic redevelopment of `Docklands’ to the south of the 
borough, but the companies attracted to this alternative to the City of London 
have brought their own workforces or require skills which young Bangladeshis 
lack. High rates of youth unemployment coexist with an expanding informal 
economy, where drugs play a prominent role.  
 
Culturally, since the vast majority are Muslims, an important feature of the last 
twenty years has been the growing power of Muslim institutions and Islamic 
organisations based in Bangladesh and the Middle East. The arrival of wives and 
dependants during the 1980s and 1990s has resulted in a greater emphasis on the 
norms and values of Muslim family life. Another key issue has been language. 
The Sylheti first generation has clung to local dialects, while the pressures of 
Bangladeshi nationalism have encouraged the teaching of standard Bengali in 
state and community schools.  
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History of Migration 
Although concentrations of Bangladeshi residents can be found in other London 
boroughs, as well as Oldham, Luton and the East Midlands, the 1991 Census 
revealed that almost a quarter of Britain’s Bangladeshi population was to be 
found in Tower Hamlets. This borough’s Bangladeshi population comes 
predominantly from the north-eastern district of Sylhet. Sylheti sailors (lascars) 
have been associated with Tower Hamlets since at least the early 19th century 
but the settlement of large numbers of Sylhetis did not begin until the 1960s and 
1970s. 
 
Socially, the key features of this migration are (a) the familiar process of chain 
migration from clusters of villages supported by (b) strong family and kinship 
ties. These have ensured the maintenance of powerful economic ties through the 
flow of remittances from Britain to Bangladesh. However, increasing investment 
in Britain, through education, housing and consumer goods, may be diminishing 
this flow of remittances. 
 
Age and Sex Ratios 
Tower Hamlets’ Bangladeshi population is a very young one. In terms of the 
balance between the sexes the ONS 2001 figures indicate that, nationally, there is 
almost parity (102:100) between the ages of 15 and 29 but there are many more 
men than women in the 30 to 44 age range (150:100). However, the national 
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picture is reversed at the Tower Hamlets level. According to the London 
Research Centre the ratio between men and women in the 26 to 35 age range is 
100 to 146 (Eversley 2001:18). As Eversley notes, the key issue among the largest 
concentration of Bangladeshis in Britain, therefore, may be the belief that there is 
‘a shortage of eligible, suitable men’ (Ibid.). Approximately two-thirds of women 
marry between 20 and 24, while probably less than 10 per cent of both genders 
marry before 20. 
 
Social Stress: national and local data 
According to the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
Index of Local Deprivation Tower Hamlets is ranked as the most deprived 
district out of 354 districts in the country and Spitalfields, Lansbury and Weavers 
wards are the 46th, 47th and 49th most deprived in the country (DETR 2000, 
2000a).  
 
Bangladeshi men initially found work in the local garment industry, hotels and 
hospitals. An ethnic economic enclave has been developed through the 
expansion of small shops, restaurants, cafés and taxi services. The second 
generation has also moved into local government, welfare and social service 
provision and professional occupations. Women have been far less economically 
active, although statistics may not reveal those involved in home-working for the 
garment industry. 
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At the same time Bangladeshis suffer high rates of unemployment. In 1991 22.7 
per cent of British Bangladeshi males 16 years and older were unemployed 
compared with the national average of 12.6 per cent. Although there are no 
recent figures for the rate of Bangladeshi unemployment in Tower Hamlets, we 
know that unemployment in this borough is very high (13.6 per cent of the total 
population was unemployed in 1998 compared with the national average of 4.6 
per cent) and that the Bangladeshi unemployment rate is likely to be even higher. 
For example, the Spitalfields ward, which contained the highest proportion of 
Bangladeshi residents nationally in 1991, also had the worst unemployment 
record – 24.3 per cent for men and 20.3 per cent for women compared with 
borough averages of 17.4 per cent and 7.7 per cent respectively (Tower Hamlets 
1999). In another ward where 51 per cent of the residents on the large Ocean 
Estate opposite Queen Mary College (London University) were Bangladeshi, 90 
per cent of those between 17 and 18 were `Asian’, while only 66 per cent of men 
and 32 per cent of women were `economically active’ (Carey 2000: 13).  
 
Education 
Tower Hamlets has also a poor record of educational achievement, although the 
arrival of White professionals employed in the Docklands wards may be 
changing this. By 1998 54.2 per cent of the borough’s school population were 
Bangladeshi and only 28.3 per cent were White (ethnicity recorded as England, 
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Scotland or Wales [ESW]).  
 
Even so during the 1990s the third generation of Bangladeshis have been more 
successful than their White counterparts and Bangladeshi female students have 
fared better than their Bangladeshi male peers. In 1998 36.6 per cent of 
Bangladeshi females passed five of more GCSEs at A* to C, compared with 29.7 
per cent of Bangladeshi males, 24.9 per cent of ESW girls and 17.6 per cent ESW 
boys (Ibid). These rates of success are encouraging Bangladeshis from the third 
generation to attend one of several universities nearby (especially London 
Guildhall University, Queen Mary College and the University of East London) 
and to look for jobs outside the ethnic economic enclave. At the same time, as we 
have already noted, educational achievement is not necessarily being turned into 
local jobs: ambitious Bangladeshis will have to look further afield - across the 
global city and even further. One indication of this more outward vision is the 
movement of Bangladeshi homeowners out of Tower Hamlets as they take 
advantage of the substantial increase in equity and buy more desirable 
accommodation in London’s eastern suburbs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Unemployment, multiple social stress and educational underperformance 
characterise both communities. In terms of age structure both communities are 
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young with Bangladeshis having an even younger population than the 
Pakistanis. Both are primarily working class communities of rural origin, 
unemployment is high among both communities for both men and women and 
the figures for youth unemployment are worryingly high. Both urban areas are 
deprived localities containing some of the poorest wards in the country. Human 
capital is low but increasing among the younger generation, mainly among girls. 
This also has an important effect on their success in the labour market. However, 
the London effect appears to benefit Bangladeshis and the Tower Hamlets LEA 
has shown better leadership resulting in improved educational results.  
 
In summary, both communities are primarily from a rural background, are 
working class and youthful. Both middle class professionals and the elderly are 
relatively few in number. The focus groups schema assumes equality across age, 
gender and social class but the national and local picture is demonstrated to be 
skewed towards the young and working class. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
MARRIAGE: KINSHIP AND ARRANGED MARRIAGE 
 
Introduction 
Marriage among the Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities will be examined 
within the context of kinship and the attendant issues of caste, religion and 
honour. These features provide important input into the arrangement of 
marriages among these groups and have explanatory capacity for the decision-
making process that leads to endogamous marriages. Arranged marriages only 
become understandable when endogamy is analysed. This chapter will explore 
the range of factors that are influential in endogamous marriages and then 
consider variations of arranged marriages.  
 
Marriage 
The national trend for marriage is complex. On a superficial level marriages are 
at their lowest level since 1917 and the divorce rate is the highest in the European 
Union. However, the picture is more complex than simple marriage ‘decline’ as it 
is accompanied by sequential cohabitations, separation, divorce and remarriage 
(Barlow, Duncan, et al 2001). Minority ethnic groups mirror some of these 
characteristics. Rates of marriage vary across communities with African-
Caribbean people more likely to remain single and cohabit than Whites or South 
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Asians. The rates of marriage among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were 
comparatively high - 73 per cent and 74 per cent respectively. Marriage is 
extremely popular among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis.  
 
Figure 3.1 Marriage Rates by Communities 
 
Column percentages 
 
 White Caribbean Indian African 
Asian 
Pakistani Bangladeshi 
 
Chinese 
Single 23 41 21 21 19 22 34 
Married 60 39 72 72 74 73 62 
Living as 
married 
9 10 3 2 3 1 1 
Separated
/divorced 
7 9 3 3 3 1 3 
Widowed 1 2 2 1 2 3 - 
 
Source: Modood and Berthoud 1997: 24 
 
Islam 
In the focus groups Pakistani and Bangladeshi respondents explained their high 
rates of marriage and low levels of co-habitation in terms of religion. Marriage is 
related to duty and Islam, sex is for procreation and sex before marriage is 
considered to be sinful: 
 
Most Bangladeshis are Muslims so it is part of our religion. 
(Bangladeshi Young Men, Middle Class). 
 
The reason why we get married is so that sexual intercourse is made 
legal … to prevent people to make illicit friendship and have sexual 
intercourse which is against our religion and is completely wrong. 
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Wrong for our community and is against our religion. (Bangladeshi 
Elder Men, Working Class) 
 
Parents consider it a moral obligation to marry their children and intimate 
relationships should only develop within this context. Responses were fairly 
consistent across ethnicity and generation.  
 
In Islam it is a parent’s duty to marry their children - this is 
considered to be moral act and a blessing. (Bangladeshi Elder 
Women, Working Class). 
  
[All] parents like their children to get married and God too want 
this to happen in pleasant way. If there is an intimate relationship 
between a girl and a boy without marriage, this is haraam in Islam. 
We call it haraam meaning illegitimate. The answer to this question 
is that parents do get their children married in a good way, so there 
shouldn’t be any matrimonial issues of respect or disrespect. 
(Pakistani Elder Women, Working Class) 
 
In the focus groups both Pakistanis and Bangladeshis consistently expressed this 
view across gender and all the generations. Young men and women reaffirmed 
this view but it was seen as a normative position to which women are expected 
to conform more rigorously than men. 
 
It’s just wrong to be seen with anybody else but your husband. It’s 
just for support, basically. One person to be there for another, a 
mother. Plus, our Prophet did it … We follow our Prophet’s way. 
(Bangladeshi Young Women, Middle Class) 
 
Group Boundaries and Marriage 
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The governing principle of marital choice in any community is homogamy - the 
selection of a partner from a similar social background shaped, for example, by 
race, class, ethnicity, religion, age and education. Those who do not conform to 
these norms, in some circumstances, suffer sanctions, ranging from disapproval 
to ostracism (Bradford Commission Report 1996). Marriages that do not conform 
to this pattern are uncommon and in the population as a whole trans-
racial/inter-ethnic marriages form a very small proportion, about 1 per cent, of 
all partnerships in the population. However, among ethnic minority groups 20 
per cent of African-Caribbeans were married or living as married with a White 
partner, 17 per cent of Chinese, 4 per cent of Indians and just 1 per cent of 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (Modood and Berthoud 1997: 29-30). Thus 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis conform to the national pattern of marrying within 
their social group. 
 
Marriage is an important indicator of cultural distinctiveness and is a principal 
means by which boundaries are drawn to include or exclude those who are 
eligible for marriage. Group members typically try to maintain social cohesion 
through sustaining a boundary between themselves and others. This boundary 
between insiders and outsiders depends upon both sides perceiving difference. 
Insiders are, therefore, aware of outsiders’ beliefs about their distinctiveness as a 
group and outsiders’ opinions and actions play a part in the maintenance of 
group boundaries. So marrying outside the community threatens social cohesion 
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and breaks down the boundaries, and this is why you get few trans-racial/inter-
ethnic marriages in general and specifically among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. 
 
Issues of identity and of belonging to a particular community and/or territory 
loom large in this process of boundary maintenance. These issues are usually 
linked to debates about cultural traditions embedded in distinct languages, 
religions and regions, for example. Insiders may keenly resent outsiders' interest 
in marriage strategies, even if it is justified in the name of wider public interest. 
The 1991 British Social Attitude Survey reported that 75 per cent of White 
respondents believed that White people would mind if a close relative was to 
marry a Black or Asian person. Among minority ethnic groups the highest 
disapproval was found among Pakistanis with 64 per cent minding strongly, 52 
per cent of Indians disapproved followed by Bangladeshis (35 per cent), with 
African-Caribbeans having the lowest disapproval rate. The Pakistani 
disapproval rate coincides with the fact that only 1 per cent of Pakistanis are in 
trans-racial or inter-ethnic marriages.  
 
The anomaly here is that while Bangladeshis have a much lower disapproval rate 
than Pakistanis, the percentage of trans-ethnic marriages is equally low in both 
communities. There is no clear explanation for this incongruity but it may be due 
to the asymmetries in sex ratios explored in Chapter 2 (for more detail see annex 
1). Generally speaking, the PSI Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities 
 31
suggested that on the whole people without qualifications and in manual 
occupations minded ‘mixed’ marriages more than middle class professional 
groups (Modood and Berthoud 1997: 315). The data examined in the previous 
chapter clearly shows that both groups are predominantly working class, with 
low human capital and, therefore, more likely to be against mixed marriages. 
 
Despite the appearance of group solidarity the boundaries may be highly 
contested by some insiders. Global migration has created a complex situation 
where debates about local and national boundaries may be shaped by trans-
national allegiances (to a global Islamic community or umma, for example), by 
visions of multiple homes and increasing individual choice, as well as by 
perceptions of living in a risky world undergoing rapid social and cultural 
change. Social mobility can weaken boundaries and conversely deprivation and 
exclusion, explored in chapter 2 (see annex 1 for more details on this), can lead to 
the reinforcement of group solidarity. 
 
Kinship and Marriage 
Group boundary maintenance is sustained by family involvement in marriages. 
Individuals rarely make marital decisions without the involvement of families. 
Both the state and religious authorities regulate these decisions and they confer 
rights and obligations on partners and their relatives. The family, therefore, plays 
an important link between the private and public sphere.  
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What differentiated South Asians from most other minority ethnic groups and 
the wider public is the practice of arranging marriages within lineage groups. 
Among Bangladeshis and Pakistanis extended families play an important role in 
the decision-making process. Both communities, however, are not homogenous 
entities and contain numerous sub-groups and marriage arrangements are 
usually between these sub-groups. The family plays the crucial role in the 
process of arranging a marriage and it is usually the mother and siblings who are 
involved in the process of selection. There are various criteria that are applied to 
produce a suitable match. These criteria vary depending on whether the 
marriage pattern of the collectivity is endogamous or exogamous in nature. 
Among Pakistani and Bangladeshi rural migrants to Britain, in particular, 
marriages between individuals take place within the wider context of extended 
family ties and marriage alliances over a long period of time. 
 
As many anthropologists have pointed out, South Asian marriages cannot be 
understood separately from dowry involving the flow of goods and/or money 
from the bride's family to the groom's, or dower, which is the reverse. Both 
practices can be found among Sylhetis while dowry was practised among 
Mirpuris and dower among Pakhtuns. Katy Gardner noted the increasing 
expense of marrying off daughters in the Sylhet village of Talukpur and argues 
that:  
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this is less to do with the changing value of women's labour, or 
their increasing subordination, and more to do with competition 
between affines, the use of marriage in upward mobility, and the 
need for women, and the goods they carry with them to be 
"markers" of the reputation and social position of their natal 
households' (1995: 178). 
 
This raises important questions about how marriage alliances have changed with 
migration to Britain. Both Werbner and Shaw argue that social class is becoming 
a determining factor but alliances are still justified in terms of zat and kinship 
(Werbner 1990: 120 , Shaw 1988: 107) 
 
While the 1991 Census refers to the category `Pakistanis’ the population is highly 
differentiated on linguistic, ethnic and clan lines. When it comes to marriage 
partners, endogamy means not simply marrying within the Pakistani community 
but within a specific kin group. Strong regional ties differentiated Pakhtuns from 
Punjabis and from the majority of British Pakistanis, who come from northern 
Pakistan, especially from the Azad (Free) Kashmir district of Mirpur. These 
regional differences map on to the towns and cities of this country since : 
 
Mirpuris predominate in the Pakistani populations of Bradford and 
Birmingham, for example, while Faisalabadis [from the Punjab] 
reportedly predominate in Manchester and Glasgow. (Shaw 2001: 
317).  
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These regional differences are compounded by social divisions based on family 
(khandan), kinship ties (biraderi), caste or caste-like groups (zat) and tribe or caste 
(qaum). These territorial and social forces provide the background for a process 
which lies at the heart of our study – the contrast between an increasing 
disposition to marry cross-cousins among some Pakistani groups from the 
Punjab, on the one hand, and ‘a European, North American, and Japanese 
decline in consanguineous and especially first-cousin marriage’, on the other 
(Shaw 2001: 332). This process is ‘not simply a question of following a cultural 
preference for close kin marriage’, because for many parents, ‘it makes good 
sense to meet the obligations to consider your sibling’s children as spouses for 
your own children’ (Ibid). It provides status within the biraderi, demonstrates 
migrants’ commitment to their relatives in Pakistan, and can bring social and 
economic benefits.  
 
Shaw argues that these benefits encourage some Faisalabadi entrepreneurs and 
Punjabi factory workers in her Oxford sample to sustain cross-cousin marriages. 
Those who are more likely to reject this strategy are upwardly mobile, as well as 
those who have been brought up in this country, ‘particularly those with higher 
education and economic independence’ (Ibid). Increasing education amongst the 
younger generation of Pakistanis links to a decline of first cousin marriage 
amongst this group. Chapter 2 (and annex 1) shows gender differentials with 
girls becoming more educated than boys resulting in differentials in expectations 
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from marriage. Conversely, low literacy rates amongst parents are associated 
with high levels of consanguineal marriages – hence the reluctance of educated 
women to contract trans-continental marriages. Focus group evidence supports 
the claim that educational differentials across generations are resulting in 
differing expectations over marriage.  
 
Family and marriage dynamics among British Bangladeshis have not been 
analysed by researchers in any depth so far. We do not know how much the 
process of migration and living in this country has altered marriage customs. 
However, since the vast majority of British Bangladeshis hail from one particular 
district – Sylhet — we can draw on the work of Katy Gardner, especially her 
ethnographic study of Talukpur, a Sylheti village community, in Global Migrants: 
Local Lives (1995). She notes that kinship is ‘one of the principal factors of social, 
political and economic organization’ in Talukpur as elsewhere in rural 
Bangladesh (1995: 28-29). Kinship is patrilineal so that ‘ancestry is traced back 
through the male line’, creating patrilineages (gusthi). In Talukpur the gusthi 
usually included ‘siblings and cousins of one’s father and paternal grandfather, 
and their spouses and offspring’ (Gardner 1995: 29). Traditionally most 
marriages ‘were arranged with local descent groups, and often with maternal 
and paternal cousins’ but there was now a trend towards marrying people 
‘outside the local area’ (Ibid: 171). The exchange of brides still continues but ‘the 
new marriages help form important new economic and political alliances, often 
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expressing (and adding to) increased economic and social mobility within the 
area’ (Ibid). The implication of her data for migrants to Britain is that marriage 
here can be stretched even wider so that alliances can be established between 
migrant families within Britain for social, economic and (perhaps) political 
reasons, as well as between British migrants and a wider network of families 
across Sylhet.  
 
Although we do not have detailed information about British Bangladeshi 
marriage patterns, there is some anecdotal evidence that British 
Bangladeshis/Sylhetis are seeking marriage partners from both their country of 
origin and within Britain, as we shall see later in the report when we consider the 
Tower Hamlets focus groups. What the balance is between these two options we 
cannot say as yet. If the picture described by Shaw in Oxford is anything to go 
by, socio-economic factors as well as cultural forces are swaying the balance. 
Family elders will be taking into consideration the educational background of 
marriage partners in Britain and Bangladesh, their ability to contribute to family 
income within this country, and their facility in English, as well as such other 
factors as the desire of their British-born children to find a partner brought up in 
this country.  
 
Caste 
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Endogamous marriages are the norm for these two communities. The focus 
group contributors, however, are unclear about the precise meaning of zat (caste) 
- patrilineal groupings associated with occupational hierarchy (jati). Certain 
forms of labour are traditionally considered to be spiritually unclean and 
associated with low caste status. Family names are usually a good indicator of a 
person’s caste. Both Pakistanis and Bangladeshi elders conflate customary 
practices with Islam but there are also differences between the two communities. 
Many Pakistanis replace references to zat with extended family or village 
loyalties, while middle-aged working class Pakistanis do not think zat is so 
relevant in Britain, are more critical of it, but accept that it persists. 
 
 Q: So how important is caste? How important is village location? 
 A: Very important … 
 A: I think your caste is a lot more important to our parents, you 
know if you’re a Jackson, marry a Jackson, I mean you can’t 
marry… 
 A: Well how important is it to us? 
 A: I don’t think … 
 A: You know what it is; the caste system in this country for us now 
is non-existent 
 Q:  ….our parents still refer to it. 
 A:  …..a good caste, they’d never let you marry someone (from it). 
 A: If you’re a Blacksmith or a Shoesmith, you’d never let your 
daughter marry a Shoesmith; you’d rather let your daughter 
marry a Blacksmith. 
 A: But the strangest thing in terms of this cultural thing about 
being a Blacksmith, Shoesmith or an Ironmonger or whatever, is 
that they weren’t actually doing them trades. It was (...) going 
back ten generations past his great, great, great grandfather 
might have been a Blacksmith. (Pakistani Middle Aged Men, 
Working Class) 
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Bangladeshis refer to the significance of zat but there is no consensus about what 
zat constitutes. People are agreed that zat is a group but are hazy about what 
kind of group. A participant in a young focus group, for example, argues that 
these groups are: 
 
sub-divisions [created by] our ancestors … Most of these arranged 
marriages that’s what they look at – what background, where’re 
you’re from back in Bangladesh. (Bangladeshi Young Men, Middle 
Class) 
 
These sub-divisions are sometimes described as castes, indicating a system of 
ascribed status groups ranked hierarchically, but some describe zat in terms of 
belonging to Islam or to a particular class: 
 
This is in Islam. In Islam someone who sell scent, his daughter's 
marriage to a person who sell fish would not be right because there 
will be problem in the future...There has to be similarities on both 
sides. For example, someone has a five star hotel and another’s boys 
live in a council flat.  
 
Jaat (zat) means someone is Chowdhury, someone is Khan, someone 
is Talukder, someone is a Syed, someone is a Pir, someone is a 
Ghulam. (Bangladeshi Elder Men, Working Class) 
 
If a girl’s going into a low class family, then their children cannot get 
married to high class people. The Bengali word for class is zat 
(Bangladeshi Young Men, Middle Class)  
 
 
The normal practice for arranged marriages is to contract a marriage within the 
same caste and with families of similar social status. However, social mobility 
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and education can lead to families contracting marriage with higher social status 
and hence from superior castes. 
 
Honour 
Zat is also related to honour (izzat) and honour is associated with competition 
between families, family respect and the control of women’s behaviour. 
Relationships between families are often competitive, with each family being 
concerned about its own social standing and reputation. This is reflected in 
competition between affines, through the use of marriage for upward mobility, 
over the size of dowries, which are ‘markers’ of reputation and position of natal 
households. Marrying into the right sort of family brings respect and this notion 
is generally found across communities in the older and middle age ranges. Close 
relatives expect the right to first refusal and if this does not take place it can 
cause friction.  
 
(T)hey want their children and their daughters to you know stay 
within that family network so if they don’t get married to any then it 
can cause conflict between the brother and sister. (Pakistani Young 
Men, Middle Class)  
 
Honour becomes a clear issue in arranged marriages when formal agreement 
between families, usually between fathers, has been made. To withdraw from an 
agreement to marry by one side would lead to considerable dishonour on the 
family and this affects both women and men.  
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My father died at age of 79. I was in college, … doing my 'A' levels. I 
went back to Pakistan for the funeral. My father actually spoke to 
them in the family for my marriage. Now my mother said: ‘This 
marriage has been arranged for you by your father but he's died. 
What are you going to do?’ My first reaction was: ‘No, I wanted to 
complete my education, and this is true as well. Then I'll decide’. My 
mother said: `That's fine, but remember if you are not going to do it, 
tell us now, rather than embarrass us later on because the decision 
they have come to’ …. `And normally’, she said, `since your father 
and grandfather’s word of mouth is a word of honour and if you are 
going to go back on that this is what is going to happen to us and 
what we will do’. So I said: `Fine’. I slept over it and, by God, in the 
morning I said: `I’ll get married’. (Pakistani Middle Aged Men, 
Middle Class). 
 
Given the patriarchal and patrilocal character of Mirpuri and Sylheti rural society 
young men have usually far greater freedom in the outside world than young 
women, who are conventionally seen as guardians of the home. The young 
women focus group complained of the restrictions that were placed upon them 
in order to maintain family honour and contrasted this with the freedoms given 
to their brothers. The accumulated wisdom of elders, especially men, guards 
against the ‘immaturity’ of the younger generation. Immature females must be 
protected against their own innocence and the dangers posed by strangers – 
other Bangladeshis or Pakistanis beyond the family network and the wide range 
of those outside the ethnic boundary. Elder male focus groups tended to 
corroborate this argument. An individual’s fulfilment depends, therefore, on 
conforming to his or her role within the group. Marriages should be arranged 
through a process where the interests of the male and female individuals are 
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considered within the wider context of marital alliances with ‘suitable’ members 
of the group.  
 
Arranged and Love Marriage 
Arranged marriage, which was once common in British society, has disappeared 
but the practice persisted among the aristocracy far longer, where it was a means 
for forging political and economic alliances. Modood et al. argue that the Asian 
older generation prefers marriages to be arranged by families within the clan or 
extended family and that 'love marriages' were not the most appropriate way of 
finding a life-partner. The most frequent argument supporting this view was that 
love marriages are equated with high levels of divorce. Arranged marriages are 
seen as diminishing the likelihood of divorce because the partners are chosen for 
their compatibility and suitable family backgrounds (Modood et al. 1997). The 
Asian older generation measures the success of the marriage by whether the 
couple stay together, because divorce within a clan or extended family will have 
implications not only for the couple involved but also for the whole clan or 
extended family. Problems with a marital relationship can easily spiral out of 
control, causing difficulties and discord between families. Thus the interests of 
the clan or extended family are paramount, possibly more so than the feelings of 
the couple towards each other. The social stigma associated with divorce among 
the two communities, as well as the complex legal procedures (a civil and Islamic 
divorce is usually required), act as powerful deterrents that reinforce community 
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expectations that couples should remain together. 
 
It is argued that relationships which encounter difficulties would find support 
from the extended family so that the problems do not escalate into inter-family 
feuding. Hence, both communities treat marriage seriously and compare 
arranged marriages favourably with love marriages. It is repeatedly asserted that 
arranged marriages are more long lasting and stable than love marriages. It is 
argued that there is a much greater chance of a marriage that is arranged and 
based on tradition being successful. 
 
Marriage is not a joke, it is a long life contract and parents exactly 
want that their child should be successful in this contract. I do not 
have exact figures, however, I can say if you call these so-called 
forced (sic) marriages are more successful than love marriages. 
There is a higher rate of divorce in love marriages compared to so-
called forced marriages. There is no place for so-called forced 
marriages in Islam. (Pakistani Elder Men, Working Class)  
 
 
Young female respondents associated greater risk with love marriage because, if 
there were difficulties, family support will not necessarily be forthcoming as in 
an arranged marriage. Love marriage implied leaving the security of the 
extended family and this factor was taken into account by young educated 
women. Anwar (1998: 109-110) suggests that arranged marriage is still viewed 
with favour by young South Asians even though the numbers that were 
ambivalent increased. 
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 A: But the thing is, you know like, sometime like if you have an 
arranged marriage right you can at least and they don’t work out 
you can at least ring your parents (…). 
 A: If you have a love marriage and it breaks up then they can blame 
you for it. 
 A: (…) live your own life, you wanted to live your life, and go and 
live it now, and you’ll be left. (Pakistani Young Women, 
Working Class) 
 
Inter-ethnic or inter-racial marriages are acceptable, in theory, as long as one of 
the partners goes through religious conversion. Nevertheless, in practice, such 
alliances are not preferred because of community opprobrium attached to 
marriages outside the ethnic and religious group (Modood 1997). Furthermore, 
there is a widespread belief that these marriages result in the weakening of the 
family as a close-knit, self-help unit upon which elders can depend in their old 
age. 
 
There is a commonly held perception that a sharp distinction can be made 
between arranged and free choice marriages. This view fails to distinguish 
between various forms of arranged marriages. It also fails to see the continuum 
between traditional forms of arranged marriages at one end of the spectrum, 
where parents make the crucial decisions, and free choice marriage at the other 
end, where the individual is the primary determinant. The use of marriage 
bureaux by White people is indicative of the overlap between the different 
marriage patterns. Research by Stopes-Roe and Cochrane (1990) suggests a 
typology of arranged marriage - ‘traditional pattern’, the ‘traditional modified’ 
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arrangement and the ‘cooperative traditional’ variant. In the traditional pattern 
the parents and elder relatives select a spouse for their children, while in the 
‘traditional modified’ pattern the candidate has the power to decide the outcome 
from a shortlist prepared by the parents.  
 
Afshar (1989) demonstrates that, despite the variations in the degree of 
consultation, there was a close correspondence with parental circumstances. 
Those with strong rural connections were rarely consulted while those from 
conurbations (extended urban areas) and the more educated and affluent 
delayed marriage and enjoyed greater flexibility. In the previous section it was 
demonstrated that both communities came mainly from rural areas and 
possessed low human capital. Figure 3.2 shows that for South Asians over 35, 
with the exception of African Asians, parents choose their children’s spouse. 
Parental choice was most common among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis but was 
declining among the young. Only a minority of young Indians and African 
Asians observed the practice, indicating significant generational change. 
However, women of all groups were more likely to leave their parents to choose 
their spouse, except for young Hindus and Sikhs.  
 
There was also variation according to level of education with the practice being 
more common among those with little or no qualifications. For Pakistanis the 
practice was spread evenly across occupational classes but there were regional 
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differences. Parental choice was most common in the West Midlands but three-
quarters of Pakistanis in the North West, two-thirds in Yorkshire/Humberside 
and only half in the South East had parentally arranged marriages. 
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Figure 3.2: Parental Involvement in Choice of Marriage Partner, by Age 
Column percentage 
 
 Indian African-Asian Pakistani Bangladeshi  
 16-34 35+ 16-34 35+ 16-34 35+ 16-34 35+ 
Parents made 
the decision 
18 55 9 23 57 68 45 57 
I had a say but 
parents 
decision 
9 4 6 8 8 7 5 7 
Parents had a 
say but my 
decision 
24 11 21 22 15 9 25 12 
I talked to my 
parents but my 
decision 
27 11 33 22 11 4 6 3 
I made 
decision on my 
own 
20 12 27 22 8 8 8 13 
Can’t say 3 7 5 3 2 4 11 7 
 
Source: Modood and Berthoud 1997: 318 
 
Figure 3.3 Parental Decision over Marriage Partner, by Religion and Age 
 
Cell percentages 
 
 Hindu Sikh Muslim 
 Men Women Men Women Men Wome
n 
50+ years 50 74 72 86 62 87 
35-49 years 21 51 49 77 59 78 
16-34 years 18 20 41 27 49 67 
 
Source: Modood and Berthoud 1997: 318 
 
The ‘traditional’ pattern in the UK is now in decline as consultation and 
negotiation become more prevalent, especially among Hindus and Sikhs. The use 
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of photos of potential partners, arrangement of chaperoned meetings, the use of 
marriage bureaux, intermediaries, matrimonial columns in newspapers, websites 
and magazines and introduction slots on Asian radio are indicative of the 
‘traditional modified’ pattern’s increasing popularity. 
 
There are, however, considerable variations in the way that respondents 
described their personal experiences of arranged marriages. Even within the 
‘traditional mode’ there are variations. Some complain that they were not 
consulted or had minimal knowledge of their intended spouse but still 
proceeded with the family arrangement.  
 
They didn’t ask me where they were marrying or ask me if I like the 
boy and in fact I didn’t know about him. On engagement I was quite 
annoyed. I didn’t want to have an engagement. But it was nothing 
to do with choice. (Pakistani Elder Women, Working Class) 
 
Others had ‘traditional’ arrangements but possessed prior knowledge because 
they used to play together as children in the village or met their wives before 
their marriage because they were close relatives.  
 
I’m fortunate that both of us are compatible … and I think the other 
thing that I was looking for, was a wife to look after my parents as 
well. (...) The fact [is] that she was my mother’s niece (...). Well, I 
think my marriage is quite good. I’ve had no problems. No concept 
of divorce and that kind of lark going on. No heated arguments… 
(Pakistani Middle Aged Men, Working Class) 
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Others had a ‘cooperative’ arranged marriage, where they met prior to the 
formalisation of marriage arrangements with a chaperone and got to know each 
other before agreeing to formalise arrangements. 
 
Yeah, my … parents had an Islamic wedding, ‘cos my dad saw my 
mum and liked her and my mum saw my dad. And then there was 
an adult involved in it and they spoke to each other for hours on 
end. And they said: ‘OK, we want to get married, we really like each 
other’. And then the parents came into it. 
(Pakistani Young Women, Working Class) 
 
As for the ‘cooperative traditional’ patterns either the parent or the candidate can 
make the selection depending on the circumstances and the eventual decision is 
a cooperative matter but parental consent is essential. Young people, who had 
been going out clandestinely for several years, then used a matchmaker to 
officially introduce them in front of their unwitting parents resulting in a 
successful marriage (Gillespie 1995, Shaw 2001). 
 
Trans -continental Marriages 
For Pakistanis and Bangladeshis marriage is conducted between patrilineal sub-
groups and this may result in the lack of appropriate choices being available in 
Britain. Sex asymmetries and differentials in educational qualifications 
compounded by endogamy, mean that there may not be an alternative to 
conducting a trans-continental marriage. In Bradford 50 per cent of marriages are 
trans-continental, i.e. the partners are selected from Pakistan (Simpson 1997), 
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while in Oxford the proportion of these alliances is estimated to be as high as 71 
per cent (Shaw 2001). 
 
The difference between Oxford and Bradford primarily relates to the number of 
eligible candidates available. The Bradford population is significantly larger than 
Oxford, therefore finding an appropriate partner within a specific kin group is 
more difficult in Oxford. The demographic profile of the Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi communities shows that there is sex ratio imbalance, particularly for 
the Bangladeshi community, with more men than women at the national level. 
The lack of suitable candidates is reflected in the use of media, newspapers, radio 
and websites to look for suitable partners and the problem is even more acute 
among educated Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. While young men show some 
preference for a partner from Bangladesh or Pakistan, young women normally 
are reluctant to follow suit. On the one hand evidence suggests that women are 
more reluctant to enter into trans-continental marriages. On the other hand data 
in Chapter 2 (see also annex 1) shows that women were achieving better 
educational results then men and thus finding appropriately educated partners 
for them in Britain was problematic. These factors combine to make finding a 
suitable partner, particularly for young women, difficult (Anwar 1998: 111). 
Education transforms gendered power dynamics, of women as guardians of 
tradition and culture, and this development is seen in focus group discussions in 
Chapter 5.  
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Conclusion 
Marriage is popular amongst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and religion is an 
important factor for the high rates of marriage. Marriages are primarily 
endogamous and are used to reinforce kinship, networks and group boundaries. 
Marriage is used as an important tool in maintaining the cultural distinctiveness 
of the group and is very closely related to issues of identity and belonging. While 
the category Pakistani and Bangladeshi is used by the 1991 Census, both 
communities are highly diverse and internally differentiated in various ways. 
Marriage is conducted between sub-groups within these community categories 
and is associated with caste and honour. Caste hierarchy and status competition 
between families are important factors in understanding families’ motivation for 
marriage. Women's behaviour, dowries and marriage agreements are all linked 
to notions of family honour.  
 
Focus group contributors argued that arranged marriages are more stable, they 
are less likely to end in divorce and marital problems do not result in discord 
between individuals, although they can lead to clashes between clans and 
extended families. Hence families are very concerned about marital discord and 
they provide support so that differences do not escalate into inter-family feuding. 
For this reason, young women associated greater risk with love marriage because 
family support would be denied. Arranged marriages give greater importance to 
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the group than to the individual and are also seen as resources of bonding social 
capital. 
 
There are various forms of arranged marriages and there is a close social class 
and educational correlation with the parents' background and the degree of 
choice that is offered to their children in the arrangement of marriages. Among 
South Asians the practice of parents choosing the spouse is most common 
amongst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, but the practice is now declining and 'co-
operative' arranged marriages are beginning to become more common amongst 
the young. There is a link between the degree of choice and the class and 
qualification background of the parents. The practice of 'traditional' arranged 
marriages is strongest among those groups which are least qualified and 
involved in manual work. Both communities are disproportionately working 
class and have low human capital. 
 
Trans-continental marriages are linked to the size of the marriage pool in 
individual locations and are also associated with endogamy. The need to marry 
between sub-groups of similar status leads to difficulty in finding appropriate 
marriage candidates. Educational differentials between young men and women 
and sex asymmetries make it difficult to find partners. Young educated women 
are more reluctant then young men to enter into trans-continental marriages. 
Hence the proliferation of media sites and professional marriage bureaux to find 
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appropriate partners. Trans-continental marriages are associated with a limited 
marriage pool and the need to find sub-groups of similar status, educational and 
class backgrounds. Consequently, they will persist into the foreseeable future. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
FORCED MARRIAGES: CAUSES AND COMMUNITY DEBATE 
 
Introduction 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first part explores causes of 
forced marriage, defines it, examines its extent and explores motivations. The 
second section examines community responses and debates concerning forced 
marriages. We then move on to the focus group discussions where a range of 
issues were examined and we outline people’s views in their own words. 
 
Forced Marriage Definition and Numbers 
Forced marriage is not exclusively an Asian or a Muslim problem and ‘shotgun 
marriages’ were prevalent in the 1960s among the White population. The crucial 
factor, which the Home Office Working Group on Forced Marriages (A Choice 
by Right 2000) used to differentiate between forced and arranged marriage, is 
consent: 
 
it is a marriage conducted without valid consent of both parties, 
where duress is … invariably a factor of forced marriages. (p.6) 
 
The Court of Appeal has ruled that the test of duress for these 
purposes is simply ‘whether the mind of the applicant (the victim) 
has in fact been overborne, howsoever that was caused’ (p.7) 
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Duress ranged ‘from emotional pressure, exerted by close family 
members and the extended family, to more extreme cases, which can 
involve threatening behaviour, abduction, imprisonment, physical 
violence, rape and in some cases murder’ (p.11) 
 
We have tried to ascertain the size of the problem but have uncovered few 
reliable figures. The Southall Black Sisters deal with 200 (SBS 2001) cases of 
forced marriages annually, while Bradford Police deals with 70 cases (West 
Yorkshire Police), The FCO’s Community Liaison Unit dealt with approximately 
200 cases last year and the figures have increased year on year since the 
establishment of the unit. There may be some overlap in the figures and we do 
not know how many cases of forced marriages are never reported, due to the 
consequences of divorce and difficulty of facing the family. It is very difficult for 
women to act against the wishes of their parents or in cases where their 
husbands, whom they were forced to marry, have abused them. In many respects 
the phenomenon of forced marriages closely parallels domestic violence - there is 
considerable under-reporting and the figures are a small fraction of what is 
estimated to be the real scale of the problem. However, there is no evidence to 
prove or disprove speculation in the media, which suggests that there may be as 
many as a thousand cases a year.  
 
Given the difficulty involved in quantifying the scale of the problem we took the 
position that even one instance of forced marriage was one too many. We are 
also aware that this view has been criticised on the grounds that it can be used to 
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stereotype Islam as incompatible with British values, that it can lead to 
interventions where the human rights of the many are curtailed for the 
protection of a few, and that it can inhibit dialogue with people who inflict 
duress without breaking the law (Eversley and Khanom 2001). However, there is 
no suggestion that the human rights of British Asians are going to be curtailed to 
protect victims of forced marriages or that new laws are being created which 
people may innocently break.  
 
While it is difficult to estimate the scale of the problem, it is possible to suggest 
reasons why forced marriage has become more of an issue recently. As shown in 
Chapter 2 and Annex 1 all ethnic minorities have a high proportion of young 
people. British Pakistanis are only now reaching marriageable age in large 
numbers, while Bangladeshis will reach this point in perhaps a decade. These 
demographic facts indicate that a substantial number of Pakistanis are entering 
an age when they are normally expected to marry. The numbers of eligible 
Bangladeshis, on the other hand, are lower but they will probably exceed 
Pakistanis during the next five to ten years. Consequently, the issue of forced 
marriage has become more significant simply because people from these 
communities are getting married in ever larger numbers. The rapid increase in 
forced marriages due to demographic changes is the real cause for concern and 
not the absolute numbers. The demographic evidence suggests that the number 
of Pakistanis in forced marriages will fall as the size of the young population falls 
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and there will be an increase in Bangladeshi forced marriages in the near future. 
This scenario is based on the assumption that policy initiatives are not 
formulated or fail to engage effectively with this problem. Effective social policy 
could perhaps prevent a relative and absolute increase in forced marriages. The 
young people focus groups do suggest, however, that there will be a hard core of 
people who would persist in forcing their children to marry and that there would 
be a continuation of the problem. 
 
Motives of Forced Marriages 
The Home Office Working Group enumerated a number of possible causes. 
Although motivations are complex and highly personal and oversimplification 
needs to be avoided, these causes fall into three broad categories – (i) family, (ii) 
sexuality and independent behaviour and (iii) honour. (2000: 14) The evidence 
from the CLU cases, media sources and interviews with gatekeepers, shows that 
the major motive for families forcing their children into marriages was, first, 
sexuality and then independent behaviour - the two are, therefore, closely linked. 
Independent behaviour was exclusive to women, followed by other motives 
concerning family and honour. Under the first heading it became clear that these 
young women and men had boy/girl friends, were engaged, eloped or had 
married and, in all of these cases, the family disapproved. Some of the liaisons 
were inter-ethnic, others were inter-religious and many were within the same 
community. The link between independent behaviour and sexuality was usually 
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evidenced by young women desiring to go to university and work. Parents 
assumed that such behaviour would eventually result in an unacceptable 
relationship. Forcing them into a marriage of their parents’ choice was seen as a 
way of pre-empting such an eventuality. 
 
Discovery or fear of such liaisons resulted in a pretext being made for a trip to 
the Indian sub-continent. The pretext ranged from a visit/holiday to illness of 
usually one or other of the grandparents. Once in South Asia the young people 
were, in effect, incarcerated through the removal of their passports and airline 
tickets while a more suitable partner was looked for. Even when the family had 
apparently accepted the liaison through an engagement ceremony or marriage 
family members still attempted or actually forced them to marry someone whom 
the family approved of. 
 
Many of the people who were repatriated were only able to do so through the 
support they received from their boy/girl friend or, sometimes, from a 
sympathetic relative. The real difficulty in these cases is in finding out where the 
person is being held and in getting them to safety.  
 
In most cases dealt with by the Community Liaison Unit, concerns around 
behaviour and control over sexuality were primary factors and immigration did 
not appear as a motivating factor for parents living in the United Kingdom. New 
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immigration controls would be unlikely to stop forced marriages, but we 
acknowledge that our research has not looked at the influence of relatives living 
abroad (for whom immigration may or may not be a factor) on the decision to 
force a person to marry. The fact that so many cases result in applications for 
spouse settlement visas suggests that there is some pressure on couples to live in 
the UK and not in the parents’ country, i.e. immigration is a factor. Otherwise, it 
would probably make sense to leave the woman outside the UK where she 
would be more tightly controlled. The significance of our conclusion is not only 
that any new immigration control would not solve the problem but that young 
South Asians would be simply coerced into marriages and sent back with no 
expectation of returning. 
 
Family issues covered a number of areas and were linked with some cases of 
forced marriages. Concern about preventing fragmentation of landholdings in 
South Asia and honouring family obligations through betrothal continue but are 
declining. On some occasions parents came under pressure from family members 
to marry off their daughters, even when they had no intention of doing so. 
However, the combination of pressure and deference to senior relatives led to 
children being married without their consent. There were other issues related to 
crime and marital breakdown. Sending youngsters in trouble with the police 
back home was another response and in cases of divorce children may be taken 
back and married. The number of cases where immigration was the sole factor - 
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families here arranging marriages to bring relatives to the UK - was negligible. 
Family honour, however, comes into play when formal agreement has been 
arranged and at this point there is considerable pressure for arrangement to be 
carried through. At this point men become explicitly involved as they defend 
family honour. 
 
To recap, we are investigating the motives of families settled in Britain and here 
immigration was not a factor in their decision-making process. Immigration was 
a clear factor in the motivation of those who wanted to marry British citizens but 
we noted that there are cases where they influence the decision-making process 
resulting in a forced marriage. In some cases it is the overseas relatives who are 
pushing for marriages and in almost all cases the relatives hold the girl and 
arrange the marriage so they play a significant part to make sure it goes ahead. 
Family members may make agreements with relatives abroad and then may find 
they have to honour them. According to Alison Shaw some of the Pakistani 
families she sampled were disturbed by the instrumental way that their relatives 
treated marriage in Pakistan.  
 
In my sample, seven of the marriages of women to kinsmen from 
Pakistan, four of them first cousins, have ended in divorce or 
separation. In four cases, the parents now feel that their sense of 
duty towards siblings in Pakistan was exploited primarily to 
facilitate the immigration of a husband with no intention of making 
a commitment to his wife or her family in Britain (Shaw 2001: 327) 
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Debates on Forced Marriages 
The focus groups debated forced marriages within the context of marital 
difficulties. Accompanying the increase in marriage rates in both communities is 
a concomitant increase in marriage problems resulting in divorce and separation. 
The divorce rate amongst British Asians in general is around 4 per cent which is 
considerably lower than the average of 9 per cent amongst the White population 
(Modood 1997, p. 32). National figures from the Muslim Women's Helpline 
indicate that marital difficulties are a growing problem. The overwhelming 
majority of the helpline’s callers are from the Pakistani community and most are 
between the ages of 21-30. The calls mainly concern family problems related to 
marriage (The Muslim Women's Helpline 1996). The Police are dealing with an 
increasing number of cases where married women are leaving home and 
separating from their partners (West Yorkshire Police nd).  
 
Both older and younger focus group members commented on the situation 
indicating how common marital breakdown had become: 
 
[Marriages are] always breaking down [now]. Now it’s more 
common because it takes place based on two people’s decision. 
(Bangladeshi Elder Women, Working Class) 
 
 
 
And a lot of the girls what they do is say: ‘Yeah [I] will marry him’ 
and they marry whoever their parents ask for. And then they, a few  
years later, divorce him and then it’s fine that they go and marry 
anyone else.  
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(Pakistani Young Women, Middle Class) 
 
Victims could turn to a number of agencies for assistance and did do so. As for 
the elders, they deny that forced marriages are a major problem, warranting the 
intervention of the police, social services and other agencies. 
 
In reality this issue has been exaggerated … And some people 
instead of discouraging it, in reality encourage it and promote it i.e. 
for example, social services, free helpline. These are the kind of 
avenues open for a boy or girl in this kind of situation. 
(Pakistani Elder Men, Working Class) 
 
Young people, male and female, of both communities confirm this development 
and state that opposition to forced marriages is increasing but it is still easier for 
men to resist than women. At the same time young women are increasingly 
leaving home to escape such marriages – they: 
are running away from home to live with their boyfriends. (Bangladeshi 
Young Men, Middle Class). 
 
 Q:  Do you think opposition to forced marriage is growing? 
 A:  Yeah. 
 A:  Yeah. 
 A:  Yeah. 
 A:  Especially with the girls. 
 Q:  Especially the girls? 
 A:  Yeah. 
 A:  They are like little girls running away from home ... 
 Q:  Girls are? 
 A:  … running away from home. Guys, girls are running away from 
home cos they don’t want to get arranged marriages, forced 
marriages. 
 Q:  Do you think in that case then boys can get out of forced 
marriages easier than girls, do you think? 
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 A:  Yeah.  
 (Pakistani Young Men, Working Class) 
Young people indicate that the issue is gaining recognition not just among their 
generation but also among their elders. The issue was increasingly discussed 
within the community and there is a greater appreciation of the problem. 
 
At least their eyes are opening. First it wasn’t happening, you know. 
Now it’s like everyone really knows about it. It’s a big issue you 
know there’s a lot of debate about it. 
(Pakistani Young Men, Middle Class) 
 
They complain, however, that community leaders, response is inadequate and 
there was need for community representatives to be more pro-active on this 
issue. 
 
I think there needs to be a more sort of openness as well amongst 
you know like the religious leaders. They need to encourage it more 
and say that: ‘Look, this is wrong. What you’re doing?’ They need to 
come out in the open and talk to parents and they need to educate 
even the parents. It might be a bit difficult to actually get through to 
the parents but they somehow need to do that because the only way 
I think that the elders would get the respect is from elders 
themselves. 
(Pakistani Young Men, Middle Class) 
 
Parental Love Duty and Reciprocity 
Many members of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi focus groups could not 
understand how forced marriages could occur, given the love which parents 
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usually lavished on their children. Elders state that they are obliged by religion 
to ensure that marriage is voluntary and negotiated.  
 
No parent will want anything bad for their children. Parents will 
certainly seek good families for their children … Usually parents 
allow their children to marry someone they like … it’s their life’ 
(Bangladeshi Elder Women, Working Class). 
 
A contributor to a young Bangladeshi group also claims that `parents had so 
much love for their children that they would respect every single wish’ 
(Bangladeshi Young Men, Working Class). 
 
Most of these younger participants agree that they would be happy if their 
parents arranged their marriage. This was due to a combination of filial piety, 
love and trust. Parents love their children and want the best for them and their 
children understood that.  
 
But parents always do their best though. (Pakistani Young Women, 
Working Class)  
 
Some parents I know genuinely really, really love their daughters 
and sons. (Pakistani Young Men, Middle Class) 
 
In Islam or in any religion or culture, forced marriage is not allowed 
and this is confirmed by the saying of Prophet and holy book 
Quran, that marriage is between two people and this is an 
agreement and there can not be any force in this matter. And this 
has never been so. (Pakistani Elder Men, Working Class)  
 
 Q: All of you said parents apart from you why do you say that for? 
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 A:  Because my parents I wouldn’t trust their choice, my mum’s 
choice. 
 A:  (The) way that they look at it, (it) is your life you know you’re 
going to be spending it with someone and if it’s (your) parents’ 
choice it’s different, in one way yeah they could be right. 
 A:  Yeah but parents …. always decide yeah they know how you 
are, they know how the children are so they can choose the right 
person (Pakistani Young Women, Working Class). 
 
Denial about Forced Marriage 
These views about love, duty and reciprocity encourage older Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis to deny the existence of forced marriages. A common theme of 
many focus groups, conducted with elderly men and women, is the state of 
denial. Denial declines across generation with both young men and women 
arguing that forced marriage is indeed an issue. The respondents adopt 
normative Islamic positions to support the view that forced marriage is 
unacceptable in Islam and therefore does not exist. Clearly the issue is that forced 
marriages are justified by cultural tradition, which condones these practices.  
 
Elderly working class men and women claim that the whole issue has been 
blown out of proportion and context by the media, whose real target is arranged 
marriages. Participants both male and female vehemently declare that Muslims 
would not force someone to marry: 
 
No, you can’t force like that … You can’t get someone to do anything this 
way … I don’t believe things like that could take place. We’re Muslims. 
(Bangladeshi Elder Women, Working Class)  
 65
 
In fact, parents bring up a child for 15/20 years and bring them … him or 
her or to age 15/20 years, look after him and sacrifice for him, take care of 
him. And after doing all that, how is this possible that they marry their 
child in a wrong place or force him or her.  
(Pakistani Elder Women, Working Class) 
 
Elders are critical of aspects of social policy and police interventions that provide 
opportunities to youngsters and make them less dependent on their families for 
support. As far as elders are concerned the problem lies with the youth who go 
against the wishes of their parents. There is an implicit rationalisation of forced 
marriages as a short-term problem that is ironed out over time as the couple 
come to terms with the marriage. This reflects the low expectations of intimacy 
many have from marriage. For some parents this reflects their own personal 
experience of marriage where they were not consulted and had no or very little 
choice in the matter. Having said this there are examples where some had shown 
a clear preference for a partner, who is a relative, and their parents respected this 
choice: 
 
When our parents decided, our grandparents, our sisters and 
brothers, sister[in]-laws and brother-in-laws, all consulted us; they 
asked for our opinion. We did whatever our parents decided. This is 
in Islam – to do what your parents want. No parents will want 
anything bad for their children. Parents certainly seek good families 
for their children and, so when we were consulted, we just agreed. 
Whoever our parents chose for us we went along with that. 
(Bangladeshi Elder Women, Working Class). 
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This form of passive agreement by the young people is what elder generations 
want from their own children or grandchildren. However, they reluctantly 
concede that in a few cases violence is used but people should avoid making 
generalisations based on a handful of incidents: 
 
[This] weakness is an individual weakness. This weakness is not a 
weakness of all [and people] should work together with their 
children to come to an appropriate and acceptable solution so that 
these issues and problems of marriages can be solved. (Pakistani 
Elder Women, Working Class) 
 
Some women argued that there was no question of force because if the marriage 
ran into difficulties they would be held responsible. Also it was accepted that it is 
difficult to force children into a relationship when they had little or no control 
over their behaviour.  
 
I thought if I get them married by force to my brother’s daughter or 
sister’s daughter they have to live their lives afterwards and if they 
have any problems who will be responsible for that and that is the 
reason, whatever they said I accepted it. (Pakistani Elder Women, 
Working Class)  
 
A girl was to marry her cousin. Her parents arranged in Bangladesh. 
He used to write to her but she tore [the letters] up. Her parents 
plan to take her to Bangladesh, got the tickets ready [but] she then 
ran away and never returned. The parents sent the police over to her 
but she told the police that her parents threaten to kill her if she 
didn’t go to Bangladesh … She wouldn’t return. (Bangladeshi Elder 
Women, Working Class) 
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Elders also see arranged marriage as the ultimate means of stopping youth going 
off the rails and sorting them out. The knee-jerk reaction to young men’s 
involvement in drug use and petty crime or young women forming illicit liaisons 
is to get them married and thereby, hopefully, resolve the problem. The evidence 
shows that this strategy is unlikely to work. Women become subjected to abuse 
and violence while men continue with their illegal activities or liaisons.  
 
Middle-aged participants in the focus groups reluctantly accept that there is a 
problem but are very concerned with Islamophobia and the danger that our 
research would feed into that discourse - this aspect will be discussed in chapter 
6: 
I'll be the first one to stand up and say … somebody should not be 
forced, and force should not be used against their will. 
(Pakistani Middle Aged Men, Middle Class) 
 
Middle aged participants believe that forced marriage is a declining problem 
since their cohort would not conduct forced marriages. They are more 
enlightened than their parents' generations. They explain that they are acutely 
aware of the conflation of cultural practice with Islam and are consciously 
revisiting Islam and rooting out practices that originate from a non-Islamic 
heritage. Personal experience guides them and they do not wish to inflict their 
bad experience on their own children. 
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I’m … at the time, at the time when I, well when I was arranged 
marriage, I was a bit upset at first, but then I was okay with it you 
know, I thought yeah it’s okay, it’s part of our thing, how it happens 
in our community like this anyway and it’s part of my life to go 
through, and I just accepted it … from then onwards. (Pakistani 
Middle Aged Men, Working Class) 
 
Hence forced marriage would not be an issue for this generation as it is explicitly 
forbidden in Islam. Forced marriage, in their view, is a passing phenomenon, 
which would not continue due to social change that is taking place within this 
group. However, there appears to be a tension between normative positions and 
the continuing influence of cultural practices. The role of caste, for example, in 
arranged marriages for Muslims is agreed by most Pakistani middle class, 
middle aged female participants to be un-Islamic but it is still influential, even if 
its influence among their peers is declining. Middle aged women and men also 
recognise that it is very difficult to force young people into marriages they do not 
want and to sustain such relationships. Forced marriages could not be kept 
together and the danger of divorce, separation or the marriage collapsing was 
too great.  
 
 A: Yeah … they’ve been into a marriage that’s been forced. But once 
they’re back here they have the opportunity to either negate that 
agreement that they’ve made because they’ve got access here, 
they’ve got freedom. [They can say]: ‘Right, that’s it, I’ve had 
enough of you, you’re not compatible with me. I’m not happy’. 
Irrespective of the pressures imposed by families that there 
might be, or the local ties et cetera. … If someone’s not happy 
within their marriage now, they will clearly state so and say: 
`That’s it’. Whether they’ve got kids or they haven’t, they’ll say: 
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‘B***** it, I’m not happy with it’. And it’s predominantly women 
who will say that. Guys from over there and they come here and 
they can’t get on. ‘See you later mate. Off you go.’ 
   (Pakistani Middle Aged Men, Working Class) 
 
Participants in the Pakistani and Bangladeshi elder and middle aged focus 
groups, both male and female, conclude that if they do not accommodate their 
children’s desires and passions, they will not only be unable to stop them from 
leaving home and/or continuing relationships but they will also incur 
community opprobrium through their children (particularly girls) leaving home. 
They have to negotiate and persuade determined young men and women rather 
than resorting to unenforceable diktats. If children remain adamant they will 
have to capitulate and accept what their children want. Accommodation 
becomes not only a strategy for sustaining relations with their children but also 
maintaining family respect and honour in the community. This appears to 
contradict all that had been said by the respondents about putting the 
community and family first. However, it indicates the tension between theory 
and practice, and preferred behaviour that conforms to tradition may not be 
possible or enforceable due to ground realities forcing parents to behave 
pragmatically. 
 
 A: The danger with that is that when kids get to that particular age 
and you start to exercise certain discretion, and say you can’t 
meet so and so, or I can’t let you marry so and so. Then the 
ending of that is, is if the kids are adamant enough, and cases are 
now coming across that the girl will say: ‘Well, b***** you mum 
and dad, I’m off’… 
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 A: That’s right. 
 A: That’s right, they’ll rebel then. 
 A: … your respect and your standing within the community, and 
your tribe or your tradition, or what ever you come from. ‘I’m 
going with this bloke whether you like it [or] you don’t like it’. 
So rather than that occurring, it’s in our interests as parents to 
say: ‘Although you like this particular person, have you 
considered all these other things that go along with that 
particular person? His parents, his background, and the 
problems that you know you perceive there to be?’ And if, 
having explained all that, and the kids saying: ‘No, I’m still 
going’ there’s nothing you can do. So you have to accept what 
the kids decide. (Pakistani Middle Aged Men, Working Class)  
 
There is a reluctant acknowledgement of the unacceptability of the use of force 
and the dishonour that force brings. Trying to maintain family honour through 
the use of or threat of force only brought dishonour.  
 
In reality, parents over here are helpless. There is no way children 
can be forced in this country. Parents are well aware that times have 
changed and doing this kind of force, or talking about using this 
kind of force, will cost or bring bad name to them. (Pakistani Elder 
Men, Working Class) 
 
Parents conceded that they had to make the best of things and that if they were 
unhappy with a relationship it was better to come to terms with it, otherwise it 
may provoke a response that would cast a shadow over the family’s reputation. 
 
When boys and girls choose their own partner for marriage you’ve 
got to accept … It’s better to get them married … What can you do? 
… Parents might as well allow the marriage to take place. This is 
better than running away … than doing something bad’. 
(Bangladeshi Elder Women, Working Class) 
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The reaction of young men and women of both groups to inter-ethnic and inter-
religious marriages is clear - physical pressure or force are not acceptable. This 
reaction differentiates them from the older generation. When the middle aged 
male groups were asked what would be their response in such a scenario, three 
responses were articulated – firstly, they would persuade their children that 
inter-ethnic or inter-religious relationships are not acceptable and that it should 
be ended; secondly, they might use psychological and emotional pressure by 
threatening to disown their children and, thirdly, there was the option of the 
potential spouse converting to Islam. Most of the discussion related not to inter-
racial marriages but to inter-religious ones. This area was considered to be the 
most sensitive. The discussion does show that social change across generations is 
taking place and that physical pressure is not considered to be an option.  
 
You know Islamically speaking, if my daughter went out of Islam, 
you know to get married, you know, I don't know, non Islamic or 
in any other way, I would most ... definitely use force…  
 
 Q: To what extent, would you lock her up? 
 A: … well no, no … 
 Q: Drug her? 
 A: … I mean … 
 Q: What do you call force? 
 A: … Mainly it would be hard counselling you know, really to 
change her ways … 
 A: Emotional blackmail. 
 A: …  well, yeah, if you want to call it ….. If you wanna call, to 
brainwash her mind.  
 (Pakistani Middle Age Men, Working Class) 
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The focus group responses raised the question of how coercion is understood. 
While it is generally agreed that physical force is unacceptable, psychological 
and emotional pressure is not considered to be coercion. Young people of both 
communities and gender were against any sort of coercion. Emotional and 
psychological pressure was just as unacceptable as physical force. 
 
Gender and Ethnicity 
Some have portrayed the issue of forced marriages as illustrating gender conflict 
within these communities. Are men, then, forcing women and young men into 
unwanted marriages for their own interest and was this also an expression of 
men saying that they were in charge? This perspective was seriously considered 
and evidence to support this was examined. There is considerable evidence to 
suggest that gender oppression is prevalent in South Asia and this was 
demonstrated in detail in the report Human Development in South Asia. Life 
expectancy of women is lower than men, they have a poorer state of health, 
lower rates of education and nutrition and these biases were ultimately reflected 
in the gender imbalance of 94 women to 100 men when the global ratio is 106 
women to 100 men (Haq and Haq 1997). The discrimination of women among 
Muslims has been generally subscribed to the confusion between religion and 
culture where non-Muslim misogynistic cultural practices override Islamic 
tenets. Islamic law explicitly forbids forced marriages, does not recognise the 
validity of a marriage where consent is absent, and gives considerable freedom to 
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women in the area of education, work, inheritance, etc. Cultural practices, 
however, impose a number of restrictions and customs, which confine women to 
the home and to the veil Pakistan Commission on the Status of Women, 1989: 30). 
This dichotomy between culture and religion has been eroded over the last 
twenty years in some South Asian countries, especially in Pakistan, due to the 
Talibanisation of Islam. The influence of these interpretations is also seen in 
British mosques as Imams are imported from South Asia and then use the pulpit 
to expound their conservative views (Lewis nd). 
 
South Asian cultural practices, particularly in rural areas, have strong patriarchal 
ideologies that can be in conflict with Islam but are still influential. As Agarwal 
(1994: 52) argues, gender relations are usually defined as relations between men 
and women but also relate to gender hierarchies between individuals of the same 
sex. Mothers play a central role in socialising their daughters’ behaviour so that it 
conforms to the desired pattern (Afshar 1989). In South Asia the ideology of 
segregating women is so powerful that young girls from an early age are 
secluded from men and boys and their movements are restricted to the private 
sphere. This regulation of young women’s movement is implemented by the 
women in the household, mothers, elder sisters and mothers-in-law, and this 
clearly shows how women internalise patriarchal ideology and then become its 
enforcers (Report of the Pakistan Commission on the Status of Women 1989). 
Thus, in the case of forced marriages, women are in many cases voluntarily 
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involved in acts of coercion and even violence due to the way they have been 
socialised. While in some instances there may be pressure put on the mother by 
the husband to make children accept the marriage, in many cases they are active 
agents. The marriage process is seen as women’s work, with the mother and 
other relatives going through the selection process, moving between different 
households to vet possible candidates. Siblings, especially sisters, play an 
important role in making suggestions. Uncles and aunts also have a say in the 
marriage process but the mother normally draws up the final shortlist of 
acceptable candidates. It is from this shortlist that the father is usually brought in 
to approve the final selection and make formal agreements pertaining to the 
marriage.  
 
Women, then, are central characters in the marriage process and are also active 
agents, and are not simply coerced into supporting forced marriages but can be 
the primary agents. There are numerous examples where it was clearly the 
mother who used force against recalcitrant daughters. The significance of this is 
that social policy targeted exclusively at men would be less effective than policy 
targeted at both men and women. However, once the behind-the-scenes work 
has been completed, men are brought into the picture to officially approve the 
agreements. At this point family honour comes into play and any attempt to 
break the agreements results in men becoming active in the defence of honour. 
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Parents of both families are responsible for marriage negotiations and it is 
important not to overplay or underplay the role of any of the actors.  
 
Honour and Men in the Public Sphere 
Most South Asian communities are concerned with the linked issues of honour 
(izzat) and shame or modesty (sharm). These concerns have an effect on gender 
relationships, for whilst men defend and advance the family’s izzat through 
active participation in public activities, women demonstrate a sense of sharm by 
excluding themselves from such arenas and ensuring that their own personal 
izzat is unimpeachable. Flagrant disregard of segregation and conventions of 
modesty raise issues of family honour. In theory male behaviour is also regulated 
by shame but in practice there is very little that men cannot do and that would 
bring dishonour. Men's claim to izzat is really about controlling women and their 
departure from the home is seen as a threat to patriarchal domination. Amrit 
Wilson (1978) argues that izzat is more than honour and self-respect. It is:  
essentially male but it is women’s lives and actions which affect it 
most. A woman can have izzat but it is not her own, it is her 
husband’s or her father’s. Her izzat is a reflection of the male pride 
of the family as a whole (1978: 5)  
 
Parents consider it to be their greatest responsibility to guard the izzat of 
their daughters and through them their own izzat. 
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The Bradford Commission (1995) noted that loss of izzat, brought about by a 
woman leaving her home, drives male relatives to bring her back and that this 
also acts as a deterrent to women from asking for external help in coping with 
abuse and violence. Throughout the sub-continent the great majority of the 
proceedings which come before the courts are driven by issues of izzat and sharm 
(Equal Treatment Bench Book). 
 
Contributors to the focus groups make it clear that the positions of young 
women and men are different when it comes to issues of honour, shame and 
respect within the group (zat).  
If a girl who’s done something … she’d be talked out of this and 
would then be taken to Bangladesh and married off. Such [a] step is 
necessary as it is a matter of maintaining izzat. Girls at the ages of 
sixteen to twenty are not mature. (Bangladeshi Elder Men, Working 
Class) 
 
Whereas it's frowned upon a lot more with girls … you’re not 
allowed to sleep with somebody before you’re married. You’re 
supposed to be a virgin.  
(Pakistani Middle Aged Men, Middle Class)  
 
This theme is repeated by young men. A Bangladeshi middle class male argues 
that it is dishonourable for the community if a female gets: 
 
pregnant or something. It is very stigmatising … She should have 
known. She should have respected her parents’ wishes as well. She 
shouldn’t have a kid … She shouldn’t be having drinks … drugs as 
well.  
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Interestingly, a female participant in a Bangladeshi group of young males and 
females at a London University also echoes these views. According to her 
families are usually relieved when their children, especially the daughters, get 
married.  
 
[Marriage brought] relief for the family, especially when girls are 
married. Different for boys because they can bring [the] girl home … 
If girls get into drugs, they lose their respect for their parents. Parents 
will not be able to marry them to the best families.  
 
Similarly male behaviour, while not acceptable, is tolerated and does not result 
in drastic actions by parents: 
 
If it's boys ... it's kind of accepted …. perhaps not accepted, but more 
expected that the boy would go out and sow his wild oats (laughter) 
(Pakistani Middle Age Men, Middle Class). 
 
Others argue that sons are treated differently, partly for economic reasons – sons 
are seen as breadwinners. Daughters married out of the family and therefore, as 
we have already seen, might be attracted to ‘other cultures’: 
 
As males we are not pressurised. As a mother she loves her son 
most … They don’t want the sons to get married quickly. They are 
the breadwinners. They provide for their parents when they get 
older … whereas the daughters, to save them from going to other 
cultures, they would like to get them married quickly. 
(Bangladeshi Young Men, Middle Class) 
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Forced marriages might take place, therefore, when parents reject their 
offspring’s choice of a fellow Muslim from another country or an inter-religious 
relationship because these relationships raise issues of honour and shame. 
Differential treatment of women due to issues of honour, perhaps explains why 
forced marriages mainly affect women. In response to such liaisons parents insist 
that they marry someone brought up in Bangladeshi/Pakistani culture. Such a 
person might be chosen from South Asia or within Britain but the implication 
was that the most likely recruit would be someone from the extended kinship 
networks, which stretched across the Sylhet/Mirpur countryside.  
 
Conclusion 
The Home Office Report clearly defines forced marriage as marriage without 
consent and differentiates it from arranged marriage. There is debate about the 
numbers of forced marriages but it is clear that the problem is increasing and 
that this increase is partially explained by the demographic profile of the 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi community - they both are very young populations 
who are reaching marriageable age. 
 
The motivations for forced marriages are complex and care must be taken to 
avoid over-generalisations. However, they do seem to fall broadly into three 
categories and the category that is perhaps the most common is where young 
men and women are found to be involved in a liaison which their families 
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disapprove of. Irrespective of people’s motivations the two issues that are related 
to forced marriages are (a) the role of relatives and (b) the location and safety of 
the victims. It is quite difficult to find where victims are being held and to bring 
them to a safe location for repatriation. Families may pressurise parents into 
agreeing to forced marriages, they certainly play a role in the incarceration of the 
victims and quite often immigration is a factor that motivates them. The 
behaviour of the extended family is making families in Britain more cautious 
about arranging trans-continental marriages.  
 
British Asians have to think more carefully about the issues of arranged 
marriages. They are sensitive to the fact that forced marriages do not work, 
people divorce and separate, and that young people run away from home to 
avoid forced marriages. There are, however, generational differences in the way 
that the problem is understood. Elders expect greater passivity from the younger 
generation. They want them to accept the decisions, just as they did when they 
got married, but they are aware that they cannot force, impose or ignore the 
choice of young men and women. They do, however, see marriage as the last 
resort in stopping young people going off the rails. Middle aged participants 
believe that forced marriage is a declining problem because of their own personal 
experiences. They are aware that the elders conflate culture with religion and 
they in turn wish to disaggregate the two. Returning to a more Islamic position 
means that force is out of the question. They also realise that if they fail to 
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accommodate the desires and passions of their children they would not be able 
to stop them running away and ignoring their wishes, thus bringing dishonour 
upon them. Negotiation and accommodation is emerging because of these basic 
realities and the need to maintain family respect and honour in the community. 
While there is a clear understanding that force is unacceptable there is a lack of 
clarity over what is the definition of coercion and this can be an issue when 
considering inter-religious relationships.  
 
There is no doubt that patriarchal behaviour is imported from South Asia. 
Women are socialised by the gender hierarchy and reproduce and enforce 
imposed norms of behaviour. Mothers play an important role in regulating the 
behaviour of daughters and daughters-in-law and it is not unusual for them to 
use force against recalcitrant daughters. Men enter the scene when family honour 
is involved and women leaving home or demanding divorces results in loss of 
honour. Clearly there are differences in the way that men's and women's 
behaviour is regulated and that is why forced marriage is mainly related to 
women. Actions that flagrantly break norms of honourable behaviour trigger 
processes which ultimately culminate in forced marriage. Tightening of 
immigration control would not address this problem because young women will 
still be coerced into marriage and sent back with no expectation of returning. 
Immigration may be a factor for relatives in South Asia but it is usually not the 
trigger that leads to forced marriages in Britain.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCE 
 
Introduction 
Generation is an ambiguous and ambivalent category. Community opinions, 
however, vary according to age and, therefore, community understanding on 
issues such as forced marriage also varies. As for the category of youth, in spite 
of the ambivalence over its definition, it is generally accepted that the period 
referred to as `youth’ is extended by schooling and unemployment. There are 
two points that need to be considered here. Youths are active agents and not just 
victims. Amit-Talai and Wulff (1995) argue that young people negotiate cultural 
processes – they do not simply react to them. Yet, as much as young people try to 
negotiate generational differences, there is a countervailing pull where adults try 
to re-enculturate them. Therefore, spaces which are levered open are being 
closed, successfully and unsuccessfully, in a process that makes explicit 
hierarchy and claims to leadership. Introducing the variable of generation 
indicates that it is incorrect to assume that ethnicity produces a consistent and 
single opinion on any issue. This is especially true concerning such contentious 
issues as forced marriages, which specifically have a disproportionate effect on 
the youth generation.  
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Religion and Culture 
Differences emerge between elders and youth concerning the significance of 
culture and religion. This divergence between culture and religion in the 
younger generation can be attributed to interplay of British education on the 
cultural and nationalist heritage of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis and the 
variations in heritage means that the resultant product of this synergy differs 
between the two groups. 
 
Islam is central to Pakistani nationalism and throughout the 1980s and 1990s the 
state played a major role in the reassertion of a particular Islamic identification. 
Muslim Punjabis read and write in Urdu but traditions and cultural practices are 
transmitted orally in various Punjabi dialects. In the diaspora linguistic 
identification becomes weak. Urdu is made available by some local authorities 
but it is not the mother tongue of most British Pakistanis. Among Bangladeshis, 
linguistic nationalism is the primary feature of national identification. This 
nationalism emerged during the 1950s when the region was a part of Pakistan in 
opposition to the Islamic nationalism propounded by the Pakistani state. Bengali 
is a written language and is taught in mother tongue classes supported in the 
United Kingdom by some local authorities. Among the elder generation of both 
Mirpuris and Sylhetis illiteracy is high, making cultural transmission from one 
generation to another problematic. 
 
 83
The process of schooling in the United Kingdom has resulted in different world 
views, as well as a nurturing of critical and rational thinking among young 
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The vehicle for this transformation is the linguistic 
change that has taken place. Modood (1997) and Afshar (1989) confirm this and 
shows that the younger generation are experiencing language loss. While older 
generations speak in Urdu, Bengali or regional dialects such as Mirpuri or 
Sylheti, the younger generation consumes and produces media primarily in the 
English language (Samad 1998). Young people do use South Asian languages 
and paradoxically use them as a symbol of ethnic solidarity (Saifullah Khan 1982) 
but they are considerably less proficient in these languages than in English. This 
linguistic gap is reinforced by the fact that the majority of the youth - those born 
or raised here - can read and write only in English while their parents, if literate, 
mainly use Urdu or standard Bengali. This is far more the case for Pakistani 
youth than their Bangladeshi peers because among them Punjabi is not a written 
language.  
 
The oral traditions, customs and religious practices are, at best, only partially 
transmitted, producing differences between generations in Islamic 
understanding and identity. The rational world view, cultivated by education, is 
complemented by the rational character of modernist interpretations of Is lam, 
which are written in English. This literature is accessed through religious studies 
at school and religious activists and is freely available in certain bookshops and 
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supermarkets. The move away from oral traditions as the prime source of 
religious information means that customs and rituals, regulating the lives of the 
elder generations, do not get effectively transferred.  
 
Complementing this development is the greater emphasis on Islam rather than 
regional (Mirpuri or Sylheti) identities among many members of the younger 
generation. As South Asian linguistic skills are lost, identification with Pakistan 
or Bangladesh - countries which young people may only briefly visit - becomes 
less significant and Muslim, as an identity, becomes more important. (However, 
it must be emphasised that this process is more pronounced among the 
Pakistanis than Bangladeshis due to their divergent heritage.) 
 
The emergence of Muslim identification is not related to an increase in religiosity 
or to the rise of 'Islamic fundamentalism' but becomes prominent, paradoxically, 
as people become British. However, it also appears the case that middle class 
youth, because they retain greater linguistic skills and have better familiarity 
with Pakistan and Bangladesh due to greater opportunity of travel, are more 
strongly associated with South Asian identifications (Samad 1998).  
 
Arranged marriages, particularly trans-continental marriages, are seen by the 
elder generation as a strategy to culturally rejuvenate children brought up in the 
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United Kingdom. Bringing over a spouse or fiancée from Mirpur or Sylhet 
compensates for the loss of culture they believe is taking place here.  
 
If a boy from here marries a girl from back home, then that girl 
keeps that boy within the culture. And if he is not straight, meaning 
out of line as far as his cultural duties are concerned, she brings him 
within the culture. This is our experience and this happens nine out 
ten times and this is one of the advantages of getting married in 
Pakistan. (Pakistani Elder Men, Working Class) 
 
These generational differences appear to shape Bangladeshi and Pakistani focus 
group discussions of the roles played by religion and culture in arranging 
marriages. Older Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are more inclined to insist on due 
consideration being given to both religious and cultural factors. Both Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi elders would find it unacceptable if someone married out of 
their ethnic group even though it was to a Muslim. 
That wouldn’t make any difference. It’s the fact that she/he is from 
different culture and language – different everything. How are we 
going to accommodate this? I couldn’t accept this. (Bangladeshi 
Elder Men, Working Class) 
 
If we marry outside our culture, then our culture will disappear. For 
an example, if one marries a Jamaican then he or she does not know 
about our culture i.e. looking after others, caring for others and 
looking after parents. (Pakistani Elder Men, Working Class) 
 
In contrast, a number of younger Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are not so 
emphatic and some claim that racial and ethnic differences should be irrelevant 
when choosing a marriage partner. Arguing that elder generations confuse 
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religion and culture, young people employ religious based arguments to 
challenge cultural norms opposing inter-ethnic marriages. 
 
If the family is properly religious … they wouldn’t care whether he 
was White or Black as long as he was Muslim … But for some 
people it does matter – the cultural people. They get religion and 
culture mixed up. (Bangladeshi Young Women, Middle Class) 
 
 Q:  And do you think marrying into another ethnic group is 
acceptable? 
 A:  Yeah. 
 A:  I wouldn't think about it. … 
 Q:  Would you marry somebody else other than a Pakistani? 
 A:  No. 
 A:  I think it depends. I … it really, really depends. 
 A:  It depends like if you're totally on the same wavelength, why 
not. (Pakistani Young Women, Middle Class) 
 
 
In the case of inter-religious marriages there are also religious injunctions that 
have to be considered. Most interpretations of Islam allow men to marry 
Christians and Jews without the necessity for conversion as these religions are 
considered ‘to be of the book’ (aleh-kitab). Women from other religions have to 
convert to Islam. In the case of a Muslim woman she is forbidden from marrying 
a non-Muslim so the man must convert to Islam. Failure to do this would lead to 
rejection by the woman’s family. Male responses are ambivalent on this issue. It 
comes down to the type of family people come from. If the family is a ‘really 
western type’, it may be considered but ‘a really traditional family’ would not 
consider it. Others argue that ‘even a western family’ will not accept their child 
marrying a non-Muslim. Women, however, of all ages reject the suggestion that a 
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Muslim could marry a non-Muslim, not only because of family rejection, but also 
on moral grounds.  
 
 Q: What about different religious groups, would you consider that? 
 A: (In unison) No! 
 A: No one would accept that. 
 Q: No? 
 A: It's not about them accepting, it's about my own self, I wouldn't.  
  (Pakistani Young Women, Middle Class) 
 
 A: … (it) is looked down at, the worst thing that can happen is for a 
Muslim girl to marry out of Islam … Even the man, even if he 
marries out of it yeah, and he marries an English girl and she 
converts, even if she didn’t convert yeah he could  still take her 
to his family. But whereas the girl … The girl, right? - if the girl, 
she got married out of religion that’s it, she’s out, completely out. 
(Pakistani Middle Aged Men, Working Class) 
 
Social Change, Parents and Arranged Marriage 
Popular White perceptions conflate forced marriages with arranged marriages 
and see little or no difference between the two practices in spite of government 
policy to make a clear distinction between the two. Ministers have consistently 
stated that they are not against arranged marriages: they only want to eliminate 
the practice of forced marriage.  
 
There is no clear delineation between arranged marriages and love marriages – 
rather, they are aspects on the same continuum. The common variable on this 
continuum is the element of choice that candidates have in marriage, where there 
is limited choice in arranged marriages and greater choice in love marriages. 
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There is a wide range of practices, ranging from limited consultation to free 
choice. As shown in Chapter Three the element of choice is influenced by the 
degree of urbanisation, education and parental affluence.  
 
The issue of choice has become more central as children, socialised and educated 
in Britain, are reaching marriageable age. Some young people use arguments 
about genetics to persuade Pakistani parents that consanguineal marriages are 
unhealthy and may lead to disability in children. These arguments are used to 
challenge parents’ preoccupation with endogamy and are indicative of social 
change emerging in the younger generation. Parents realise that if their children 
are adamant about a particular relationship it is better to accept it and to 
formalise the relationship. Parents are under pressure from their offspring to be 
more flexible and try to reconcile young people’s emotional aspirations and 
demands with the formality of arranged marriages. 
 
 A: … it’s actually a better thing to say: ‘Hang on, we’ve got our own 
kids’. Perhaps the concept of choice is relevant, but within the 
confines of arrangement. I mean it’s not wrong for let’s say … 
 A:  You’re not gonna force them. 
 A: … Yeah, someone’s son brings his dad and says: ‘I wanna get 
married to your daughter, right?’ And your daughter likes this 
guy cos they’ve been going to school together … 
 A: Logically I would. I’d, if he come and I knew that this was a close 
relationship and I can’t really split this, I probably would go for 
that. 
 A: … I would plan, you know? Like, my plan, my thought of mind 
would be, would be, I would go through the arrangement to 
assess but not like a forced arranged marriage. Like an arranged 
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marriage but with the consent of my children. (Pakistani Middle 
Aged Men ,Working Class) 
 
Trans-continental marriage 
Clear generational differences emerged on the issue of trans-continental 
marriages. Male and female elders from both communities are strongly in favour 
of bringing over either a spouse or fiancée from South Asia. They cite the 
strengthening of family links and the reinvigoration of cultural norms among 
children as reasons. 
 
 A. Well, I have a daughter and through her if I can bring my 
nephew over, then that's going to be really beneficial for me as 
well as his family ... It's my nephew –I would think of how to 
improve his life. 
 A: Parents are also worried and believe their children are deviating 
and that everything they're doing is against Islam. (Bangladeshi 
Middle Aged Men, Working Class) 
 
 
A minority believed that trans-continental marriages are not working. A few 
elders argue that marrying educated men and women to barely literate relatives 
is not a recipe for a successful marriage. Expectations are so different and couples 
could barely communicate because they don't speak a common language. These 
relations limp along simply because most women are socialised into considering 
divorce or separation as unacceptable, especially if she was brought over from 
South Asia. 
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Because of language barriers. She'll speak English and he Bengali, so 
they'll have problems with language. Some will cope all right, 
thinking they've no choice but others will not think like that'. 
(Bangladeshi Elder Men, Working Class)  
 
Cultural practices are also an issue. 
 
They arrange the marriage because the boy is from the UK. They 
don't look at the family or anything else. When the girl arrives in the 
UK she finds the boy’s behaviour or lifestyle unacceptable. 
(Bangladeshi Middle Aged Women, Working Class). 
 
This led a minority to argue that the youth should be given greater say and 
should marry someone from a similar background living in Britain. 
 
Young men and women from both communities, however, are more suspicious 
of trans-continental marriages. They do not reject the option of such alliances out 
of hand but they claim that language, culture, different expectations and 
awareness of the instrumental behaviour of spouses from South Asia should be 
considered. Both young Bangladeshi and Pakistani contributors to the focus 
groups believe that linguistic and cultural issues would be major obstacles if a 
partner came from South Asia. In nearly all the cases of forced marriages 
handled by the Community Liaison Unit, the girl is married to a village boy from 
Sylhet or Mirpur. 
 
I wouldn’t encourage it because the girl needs someone on her … 
wavelength. Someone she can interact with. She cannot spend the 
rest of her life with this person who can't even speak English. 
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(Bangladeshi Young Women, Middle Class) 
 
A young man argued: 
 
You’ve been brought up in the Western culture. You’ve got nothing 
in common with the person in Pakistan apart from religion and 
background culture, but for her it’s not background culture - that’s 
their culture full stop and it’s gonna cause conflict. (Pakistani Young 
Men, Middle Class)  
 
Others point out how relatives brutally exploit marriages for immigration 
purposes.  
One of my uncles’ friend’s sister got married - her marriage didn't 
last four weeks because of that. He just wanted to come to this 
country. (Bangladeshi Young Men, Middle Class) 
 
Some respondents suggested that potential candidates , educated and from urban 
areas, are possibly more compatible and better equipped to prosper in Britain. 
 
in individual cases when people like in … Karachi and Islamabad in 
the cities they’ll be more educated and there may be that sense of 
compatibility when they actually meet in those sort of cases. 
(Pakistani Young Men, Middle Class)  
 
Finding a suitable partner is not easy when issues of caste, education, sex ratios 
are considered and a suitable person may not be available in the United 
Kingdom so they look to the sub-continent. Depending on the size of the 
extended family there may not be an appropriate British candidate at the time 
thus necessitating a trans-continental marriage.  
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 Q: No, where you find your … in Pakistan. 
 A:  Oh, no … 
 A:  No, I’m strongly against that. 
 A:  I don’t agree with it. No. 
 A:  No, I don’t really. 
 A:  I’m not against it or for it. I’m not saying I’m specifically going to 
go to Pakistan only to get a husband. I’m just saying that, if all 
else fails, then there’s always (that). (Laughter). 
 A:  Yeah. 
 A:  Cos that’s the thing, it’s different in every case. There’s a lot of 
marriages … and they work out and there’s [those] in England 
and they don’t work out. 
 A: I would regret it so much if I had it in my head that: ‘Oh, I will 
marry a guy only from England’ and then it turns out that [there 
is no one available]. (Pakistani Young Women, Working Class) 
 
Social Class and Rise of Individualism 
There is evidence of considerable social change among the young Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis. Firstly, young people socialised in the United Kingdom have a 
greater sense of individualism than the older generations. The key factors here 
are higher education and social mobility. Secondly, language differences are 
emerging, especially among Pakistanis, making it more difficult to transmit oral 
traditions across generations in Britain. Language change is further exacerbated 
by attitudinal changes which are clearly evident among the youth focus groups. 
The result is that young people from both communities have different priorities 
when considering marriage. The significance of caste status has become less 
relevant while education and social class have become an imperative in arranged 
marriages. The majority still want arranged marriages but with a greater degree 
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of choice. When asked what were the greatest influences when choosing a 
partner, one respondent replied: 
 
First, I think it is individuality and then it is family. (Bangladeshi 
Young Women, Middle Class) 
 
Another Bangladeshi compares his parents’ generation with what might happen 
when he marries: 
 
[People considered] where the partner’s family was from, how 
wealthy they were, what was their caste background. My own 
wedding – the categories will be far more lengthy … It won’t 
necessarily be just looking at status. I personally have my own 
preferences and I believe … that I can have these. (Bangladeshi 
Young Men, Middle Class) 
 
Education is an important qualification, especially for young women since it is 
assumed that educated men will be less traditional and conservative. 
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 A:  I feel the more educated they are the more liberal they are, in terms of 
their views. … 
 A:  (Laughter) They break out of that tradition don’t they? Like if they’re 
more educated they break out of cultural tradition of you know getting 
married within the family. (Pakistani Young Men, Middle Class) 
 
There was a lively discussion by young men and women on the future of 
arranged marriages. Many consider that love marriages are becoming more 
feasible and some young people suggest that it may become the norm in future 
generations. Others disagree, arguing that it is a cultural dimension which will 
persist.  
 
I think in the future people are going to get married and say: 
‘Mum and dad, meet your daughter-in-law!’ (laughter) Most 
teenagers now, like between our age range, they’ve got their own 
girlfriends they want to spend their lives with. So they have got 
ideas. Times have changed. (Bangladeshi Young Men, Middle 
Class) 
 
 A:  And if you give it two … more generations, there’ll be … hardly 
any arranged marriages going on. It’ll be all love marriages and 
people will find each other and you know … 
 A:  I disagree … 
 A:  I disagree … 
 Q:  Why do you disagree? 
 A:  I disagree because I think it’s against the culture and religion. If 
people follow it in the correct way then arranged marriage is the 
best way to do it … 
 A:  In two generations time it’ll be our kids’ kids and they’re not 
gonna have much knowledge of the culture. (Pakistani Young 
Men, Middle Class) 
 
Young people believe that forced marriages are a much bigger problem than the 
middle-aged and elder groups do. They are at the cusp of major life cycle 
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changes and are more concerned by such issues. Primarily, they are at a 
marriageable age and sensitive to parental pressures. They argue that their 
parents do not listen to them and that their concerns are not understood. This 
generational gulf is exacerbated by linguistic change where parents and children 
do not speak a common language with fluency. Most youngsters are happy with 
the concept of arranged marriages but it is clear that they want far more say in 
the process than they have enjoyed so far. They are challenging caste norms and 
most want to have a wider range of choice than is normally allowed. As for 
trans-continental marriages some are happy with them, while many clearly 
favour finding a partner already living in Britain. These views do not accord with 
those expressed by the older generation and are evidence of the social change 
taking place. Emotional ties with parents remain strong and some young people 
are sorry that their parents are seen in a negative manner. However, when they 
were asked who they would turn to if faced with a forced marriage, there is 
ambivalence. Most young contributors want the matter settled within the family, 
since this is the most honourable solution. They are not keen on outside 
intervention and agree with the elders’ negative views about social services. 
They also show a considerable distrust of imams and community leaders and feel 
no confidence in turning to them for help. 
 
Conclusion 
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Generational differences are emerging in a number of areas. Young people born 
or educated in Britain have a different understanding of religion and culture 
from the elder generation brought up in South Asia. Language differences are 
emerging, particularly among Pakistanis, who consume primarily English media 
and are relatively weak in South Asian languages. Oral traditions of the elder 
generation are transmitted in South Asian languages which means that they are 
not being passed on or only partially, at best. There is a tendency for the young 
to identify themselves as Muslims rather than identify themselves with their 
parents’ country of origin. These differences in marriage practices are reflected in 
the elder generation’s insistence that both religious and cultural factors should be 
taken into account, i.e. they should marry from the same ethnic group, while 
young people are saying culture is not so important but religion is. This results in 
young people arguing that inter-ethnic marriages are legitimate but inter-
religious marriages are problematic if the partner does not convert. Parents do 
recognise that social change is taking place and are much more accommodated to 
their children's concerns and demand for choice. If young people insist on 
consummating particular relationships then it is better to accept and formalise 
their demands than to use force or to see their children running away. 
 
There is a clear generational difference over the issue of trans-continental 
marriages. Elders are in favour of trans-continental marriages because they 
reinforce cultural norms but they realise that this is not working. Young people 
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however, are much more sceptical about trans-continental marriages, 
particularly women. Language and cultural issues are considered to be major 
obstacles, but educated people from urban areas in South Asia are considered to 
be a possibility, particularly where there may not be an appropriate candidate 
available in Britain.  
 
Young people basically agree with the concept of arranged marriages but want a 
much greater degree of choice. They are challenging endogamy and prefer a 
partner who is already living in Britain. Educational compatibility is considered 
to be an important criterion, particularly by women. There are mixed views 
about whether arranged marriages will persist or `degenerate’ into love 
marriages. There is almost unanimity that forced marriage is a much bigger 
problem than the middle aged and elder groups consider it to be. Furthermore, 
they show no confidence in the way that community leaders and Imams have 
dealt with the problem.  
 98
CHAPTER 6 
 
COMMUNITY RESISTANCE 
Introduction 
Several social scientists have demonstrated that racism has entered a new phase 
and moved away from discourse about visible difference to discourse of cultural 
difference (Gilroy 1987, Barker 1981). The shift towards discriminating on the 
basis of culture has been well documented and Muslims have argued that Islam 
has become a focus of cultural racism. The Runnymede report (1997) on 
Islamophobia shows that anti-Muslim pressure is a real problem in a number of 
areas, and holds some of the media responsible for spreading prejudice. Muslim 
concerns about Islamophobia increased in the aftermath of the disturbances in 
Bradford, Burnley and Oldham and after September 11, 2001. The revival of the 
Far Right in Britain and in Europe has been based on anti-Muslim propaganda, 
leaving Muslims suspicious of the motives for outsiders’ interest in their internal 
affairs. 
 
Neither race nor Islamophobia was directly mentioned in the topic guide but 
these issues were consistently raised, without prompting, along with concerns 
over immigration legislation by most of the focus groups, especially the elder 
and middle-aged male groups. This reaction reflects the heightened sense of 
insecurity which these communities are feeling, and represents a deep distrust 
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based on history about government interest in matters pertaining to the private 
sphere of these ethnic minorities.  
 
Race and Islamophobia 
While all the focus groups, in varying degrees, showed concern that the issue of 
forced marriage is associated with race and Islamophobia, our middle class male 
participants most systematically and clearly expressed this argument. The most 
meticulous critique of the research was developed by this group, which criticised 
the study for not including Indians, restricting the focus to forced marriages and 
not covering suicide and other abuses to women. A broader approach, which 
incorporated South Asian communities as a whole over a range of issues, it was 
claimed, would produce a different picture. The investigation in its present form 
simply pathologises Muslims, reiterating and reinforcing the racist and 
orientalist stereotypes peddled by certain politicians and the media. The track 
record of earlier research was dismissed as poor with no beneficial legislative or 
administrative action emerging from them. Fears were raised that this research 
would be used to justify legislation designed to systematically assail the 
community.  
 
Rather, they argue, the communities should be proud of their family system and 
should allow children the freedom to decide for themselves and not be fearful. 
Respondents claim that arranged marriages are more stable than love marriages 
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and that divorce and domestic violence are considerably lower among Muslims. 
This reaction highlights the resistance that any social policy initiative on forced 
marriage will encounter. A highly charged debate on racism and Islamophobia 
will deflect or block any initiatives on this issue. The quote below indicates the 
insecurity that the respondents felt about the nature of the investigation. A 
legacy of suspicion has developed among these relatively uninfluential 
communities, who feel nervous and incapable of adequately debating in the 
public arena issues which they feel sensitive about. The topic guide made no 
mention of legislative implications emerging from the research. However, some 
respondents immediately concluded that this would be the end result of the 
investigation and reacted strongly. 
 
Can I just say my piece … because I’ve got to go. I’m going to say it 
as frankly as possible ... This research into forced marriages is 
another tool … designed to support the views of different political 
personalities that have been accusing the Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis of having traditions which they see as back(ward) 
outdated … not giving enough rights to youngsters within the 
Muslim community.  
 
The way that I see it is this. The research that we have 
commissioned - I can give an example of two - Runnymede Trust … 
on Islamophobia ….. and another one - both of them, …[when] the 
research was being done, everyone jumped onto the bandwagon to 
give all the information .... It is not and never has been used to help 
any … [law] or statute in the Parliament or House of Lords to help 
those communities and neither will this.  
 
I know the background information to it and politically this is the 
key and information like this as well as all the other information 
(has) been collected without the knowledge of the community. … 
There are a lot of people who are most dangerous whose views are 
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going to be in this legislation and statute … (Among the) Muslim 
community and the Pakistani community, Kashmiris and 
Bangladeshis, there's a lack of people who can understand the issues 
and articulate them. This kind of legislation is going to batter our 
community up. It is about time that people like yourselves and 
others actually stood up in the community, spoke to parents, spoke 
to children, give them … the total freedom and right of making 
decisions and be proud of them. I'm very proud of my community 
and everybody else should be. We should be proud of our family 
system and nobody else can beat that family system. (Pakistani 
Middle Aged Men, Middle Class) 
 
It is clear that the issue of forced marriages was raised initially by one MP in 
particular, Anne Cryer, and women’s groups and then picked up by the media, 
both print and audio-visual. The very public gaze on the issue of forced marriage 
makes British Asian communities sensitive to this issue rather than becoming 
reflective and self-critical. Young and old participants share the view that the 
British media is biased in its reporting of marriage practices and fails to 
differentiate between arranged and forced marriage. A member of a young 
women's group declares that: 
 
the media tends to say that arranged marriages are forced marriages 
but that’s not necessarily true. (Pakistani Young Women, Working 
Class) 
 
Most of [the reporting] is biased … Whoever gets married back 
home is, like, they’ve been forced into getting married … They don’t 
see that some people actually want to go back home and get married 
… They do not distinguish between arranged and forced. 
(Bangladeshi Young Women, Middle Class) 
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One Bangladeshi middle class young male acknowledges that forced 
marriages do take place but the few cases are used to promote 
Islamophobia. The impression was created that this problem was 
widespread: 
 
There is some truth in it but they’re going to stir it up … - basically, 
Islamophobia … They pick up a few examples of forced marriages 
and then a general picture is given and it [gives] a false perception, 
if you like.  
 
Some had seen television documentaries, which contributed to widespread 
misunderstanding about the issue. Another Bangladeshi middle class 
young male comments: 
 
They even had on BBC sometimes this programme [where a] girl 
was forced into marriage back home in Pakistan. Things like that I 
find very misleading. 
 
It creates confusion in the White audience’s mind between arranged and forced 
marriages: 
I mean, a girl I know came into my office the other week, this is 
going back about three or four months. There was a programme on 
TV I think and she got talking and said: 'Oh, did you watch that 
programme?' And I said: ‘What was it about?’ She said: ‘It was 
about arranged marriages’. And I said: ‘No, it was about forced 
Marriages’. And she said: ‘What do you mean?’. I said: ‘Get a 
dictionary and look at the definition of arranged and looked at the 
definition of forced. They are two different things altogether’. 
(Pakistani Middle Aged Men, Middle Class) 
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Bangladeshis and Pakistanis are blamed by a process of reporting where 
differences between Islam and cultural tradition are ignored – differences which, 
as we have seen earlier, some younger contributors emphasise. Another 
Bangladeshi young middle class male articulates this position in the following 
way: 
 
They lean heavily on the name of Islam which I can’t stand. They 
say: ‘Look, it’s from Islam’ … They say: ‘Bangladesh is an Islamic 
country … and that custom forces the women to get married’. And 
they take the mick … Islam and custom is completely different. 
 
Immigration Controls 
Many of the older and middle-aged respondents in the Bangladeshi and 
Pakistani focus groups believe that the government’s interest in forced marriages 
is motivated by a desire to halt the immigration of spouses. Such a view 
contradicts government statements that it has no plans to introduce tighter 
immigration control. The state’s interest in forced marriages is seen as a veiled 
assault against arranged marriages, which are equated with economic migration 
– a process which the state wants to restrict. Strong opinions are expressed about 
current immigration controls which are seen as racist, since administrative 
controls and immigration legislation target members from the New 
Commonwealth, especially those from the Indian sub-continent, and do not 
apply to Canadians and Australians. The greatest anxiety is expressed by 
Bangladeshis, whose compatriots are still in the process of family reunification 
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and would, therefore, be most likely to be affected by any legislative changes. 
Contributors to the Bangladeshi male elder group of school governors are the 
most vociferous on this issue.  
 
The British immigration [service] is just fed up of granting visa to 
the spouse of our sons and daughters who are having arranged 
marriages in Bangladesh. They are trying to stop that … The more 
such problems are created, the less chance we’ll have of finding 
boys within our own community. Our girls will then look for boys 
in other communities, such as White or black  
 
A contributor to one of the Bradford groups developed the same theme: 
 
There’s this perception at the higher levels that … the only reason 
for these arranged marriages is due to economic grounds, and it’s 
not, it might be nothing to do with that. … If our kids go (to 
Pakistan) and they actually like someone that is related to them, 
why is it an economic … migration. (Pakistani Middle Aged Men, 
Working Class) 
 
These statements show that older generations rely on historical experience with 
past UK governments, which makes them sceptical about any administrative 
initiative relating directly to them. Interestingly, similar opinions are also raised 
by young women who are irritated that forced marriage is being equated with 
immigration issues. The impression is given that: 
 
girls are being forced to Pakistan (for their passports). Well, most of 
isn’t like that. (Pakistani Young Women, Working Class) 
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There is a growing realisation that forced marriages are unsustainable. Elders 
deny that forced marriages are a major problem, given the intervention of the 
police, social services and other agencies. 
In reality, this issue has been exaggerated … And some people 
instead of discouraging it, in reality encourage it and promote it i.e. 
for example, social services, free helpline. These are the kind of 
avenues open for a boy or girl in this kind of situation. (Pakistani 
Elder Men, Working Class) 
 
There is a reluctant acknowledgment of the unacceptability of the use of force 
and the dishonour that force brings: 
 
In reality, parents over here are helpless. There is no way children 
can be forced in this country. Parents are well aware that times have 
changed and doing this kind of force, or talking about using this 
kind of force, will cost or bring bad name to them. (Pakistani 
Working Class Elder Man) 
 
When boys and girls choose their own partner for marriage you’ve 
got to accept … It’s better to get them married … What can you do? 
… Parents might as well allow the marriage to take place. This is 
better than running away…than doing something bad’. 
(Bangladeshi Elder Women, Working Class) 
 
Middle aged contributors are also not keen on state intervention but this is 
because they believe that social change is taking place and the issue will die out. 
Forced marriages have no role to play in Islam and cultural traditions should be 
separated from religious practices. While they may not be happy about inter-
ethnic and inter-religious relationships, they do not consider physical force as 
part of the repertoire of their strategies and tactics.  
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In sharp contrast to the elders and the middle aged focus groups, who spent a lot 
of energy arguing on the discriminatory nature of our research, young men and 
women claimed that the problem of forced marriage does exist and that coercion 
has no role in the marriage process. However, they also felt at a loss as to the 
strategy to pursue. They agreed that coercion has no part to play and that they 
did not accept any justification for force. Yet, for them, coercion is not a large-
scale problem, although there always will be a hardened minority who will 
persist in coercion in spite of any initiatives. 
 
Conclusion 
The study had no question in the topic guide on race, Islamophobia and 
immigration. These issues were spontaneously raised by the focus groups and 
indicate the sensitivity of the communities researched to this issue. The common 
themes raised were (a) that the study pathologises Muslims and reinforces racist 
and orientalist stereotypes and (b) that it is a surreptitious attack on arranged 
marriages. Old and young participants were worried that in the public eye 
arranged marriages were seen as the same as forced marriages. Older 
respondents also argued that government interest in forced marriages was 
motivated by the desire to halt immigration of spouses. Their sensitivity is due to 
a legacy of suspicion that makes inarticulate and relatively uninfluential 
communities feel nervous and inadequate when sensitive issues are debated in 
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the public arena. Clearly, policy initiatives around forced marriages, if not dealt 
with in a sensitive manner, can easily be derailed by such suspicion and an 
unwanted debate on racism and Islamophobia. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities contain rapidly expanding populations 
which are now entering the marriage market in considerable numbers, with the 
Bangladeshis reaching their peak in 5-10 years time. Both communities are 
primarily from rural areas, are working class and suffer from high rates of 
unemployment. A combination of racial exclusion and ethnic inclusion reflects 
their high rates of self-employment. Both communities, however, are vulnerable 
to economic downturn, regional variations and sectoral shifts in the labour 
market. Their low human capital leads to greater dependence on bonding social 
capital which, in turn, reinforces kin networks.  
 
Endogamous marriages within sub-groups based on caste and status continue 
and many people still see the group as more important than the individual. The 
socio-economic context within which these groups find themselves reinforces 
group boundaries. Bonding social capital and kin networks become valued as 
alternative resources to human and financial capital (Annex 1). At the same time 
marriage practices are changing, albeit slowly. There is evidence that greater 
choice is becoming more common amongst the young. In comparison with 
Indians these changes are taking place much more slowly due to the educational 
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and class backgrounds of parents. In the long term, improvement in educational 
outcomes and social mobility will lead to greater flexibility in arranged 
marriages. Trans-continental marriages continue due to difficulties in finding 
appropriate partners; from the same caste group, educational background and 
class background.  
 
The reasons for forced marriage are complex but the analysis does show that 
sexuality and independence among young women can trigger off a forced 
marriage. Women's behaviour which may jeopardise family honour appears to 
be an important variable. Family honour motivates men and women to regulate 
the behaviour of their children, in particular girls, and flagrant disregard of 
group norms can trigger processes that culminate in forced marriages. 
Immigration may be a motive for relatives in South Asia but does not appear to 
be a primary factor for families settled in Britain. Here the concern is that 
changes in legislation could result in women being sent back to South Asia with 
no hope of return.  
 
Community attitudes to marriage are changing and the issue of choice has 
become more pertinent than before. The elderly appear exasperated by their 
inability to enforce or impose their decisions of marriage on young men and 
women. They see marriage as the ultimate means in preventing young people 
from straying. Middle-aged participants argue that forced marriage is a problem 
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which will eventually die out. They say this because, unlike their parents, they 
distinguish between culture and Islam and it is cultural practices that legitimate 
forced marriages. They are re-examining their Islamic heritage and in the process 
are coming to the conclusion that forced marriage is unIslamic. They also, 
irrespective of their personal predilection, accept that they have to accommodate 
the wishes of their children, who are highly independent, if they wish to 
maintain family respect and honour in the community. There is a degree of 
ambiguity over the understanding of coercion, particularly with regard to inter-
religious marriages. Force is unacceptable but emotional and psychological 
pressure appears to be condoned. Young people consider any form of coercion to 
be completely unacceptable and argue that there should be greater choice in 
marriage.  
 
Generational differences are emerging in a number of areas. Language 
differences are emerging, particularly among Pakistanis, as both groups are 
primarily consuming English media and, in the process, Muslim identity is 
becoming more significant than ethnic identity. In terms of marriage this is 
reflected by the view that cultural factors are less significant than religious ones. 
While the elderly argued that religion and culture must be taken into account 
when arranging a marriage, young people are saying that religion is the only 
important variable. Young people are, therefore, concluding that inter-ethnic 
marriages are legitimate but inter-religious alliances are problematic, especially if 
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the partner does not convert to Islam. There is a tacit recognition by parents that 
if they do not negotiate and accommodate the wishes of their children they may 
be faced with a fait accompli, which would cast a shadow on their community and 
family honour. Even greater differences emerge over the issue of trans-
continental marriages. Young people, especially women, are wary of trans-
continental marriages, because of linguistic and cultural differences. They do not 
totally rule out trans-continental marriages but in such cases they would look for 
partners who come from urban and educated backgrounds as opposed to the 
villages of their families. 
 
Young people accept the concept of arranged marriages but want a much greater 
say. They challenge endogamy and show a clear preference for partners already 
living in Britain. Educational compatibility is probably the greatest concern, 
especially for women. There is considerable discussion as to how arranged 
marriages will develop in the future but there is no unanimity about this. They 
are, however, concerned that the full scale of the problem if forced marriage has 
not been recognised by their elders and there is agreement that the community is 
not responding adequately to the situation. 
 
There was considerable apprehension and criticism of the research topic itself. 
While we do not wish to overstate the significance, there was considerable 
discussion - mainly among the middle-aged and elderly contributors - that the 
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research reflected the racist and Islamophobic intentions of the authorities. 
Immigration control was considered to be the authorities’ main aim and the 
research was seen as a veiled assault on arranged marriages. The government 
has consistently distinguished between forced and arranged marriages but this 
distinction has not percolated down to the communities’ grass root levels. The 
historical legacy has been such that it has left a deep suspicion of government by 
communities which lack influence and are nervous of public interest in this area. 
The significance here is that policy initiatives have to be constructed and 
implemented in a sophisticated and subtle manner so that they do not provoke a 
diversionary debate on racism and Islamophobia. 
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ANNEX 1 
DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT:  
BANGLADESHIS AND PAKISTANIS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Introduction 
This annex elaborates on the national socio-economic context of the study 
starting with a demographic profile of the Bangladeshi and Pakistani 
communities within the context of ethnic minorities in general. It locates 
specific characteristics, such as population size, spatial distribution, age 
structure, sex ratios and employment patterns, of the target groups within the 
national context. It assists in dispelling ideas that there are peculiar traits only 
found among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. These communities share many 
features with other university ethnic groups, including ones from South Asia, 
but are dissimilar in other respects. This evidence strengthens our argument, 
explored in chapter 2, that culturalist explanations alone are inadequate in 
explaining the issue of forced marriage. 
 
Population Distribution 
The majority of the minority ethnic population (96.1 per cent) are 
concentrated in England. Only 1.9 per cent of these groups are found in 
Scotland, while in Wales their numbers are even smaller with only 1.2 per 
cent of found there (ONS Autumn 2001). Ethnic minorities are concentrated in 
urban areas; 49 per cent live in London where they make up 28 per cent of the 
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total population. Approximately 66 per cent of Black minorities are found in 
Greater London but only 33 per cent of South Asian groups are located in the 
capital city. The West Midlands have long contained the highest 
concentration of South Asians; just under 20 per cent of all South Asians are 
found there. 
However, there are major differences within this South Asian category, since 
around 80 per cent of the Bangladeshi population is found in Greater London, 
while Pakistanis are mostly concentrated in the Midlands and northern 
England (Owen et al. 2000; ONS Autumn 2001). Only 23 per cent of Pakistanis 
are found in London compared with 41 per cent in West Yorkshire and the 
West Midlands. The Pakistani concentrations (figure A.1) in the South East 
are located in north-east London, Slough, Buckinghamshire and Luton. 
Across the Midlands their substantial concentrations are to be found in 
Birmingham, Peterborough and Stafford.  
 
Figure A.1 shows that the largest concentrations - five times the national 
average – are in the ‘textile towns’, which stretch from Yorkshire to 
Manchester and South Lancashire. In contrast, the largest concentrations of 
Bangladeshis are found in the boroughs of Tower Hamlets, Newham, 
Camden, Westminster and Waltham Forest, as well as Luton and Oldham 
(figure A.2). Significant numbers of Bangladeshis are also found in the West 
Midlands. The variation in population distribution between the two 
communities indicates that Pakistanis are perhaps more vulnerable to 
economic disadvantage associated with regional variations than 
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Bangladeshis. 
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Figure: A.1 Pakistani Population by District 
 
Location quotient
5  to 11.41   (11)
2.5 to 4.999   (17)
1  to 2.499   (35)
all others   (369)
 
 
Source: Owen 1994 
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Figure: A.2 Bangladeshi populations by district 
 
 
Location quotient
5  to 77.41   (9)
2.5 to 4.999   (13)
1  to 2.499   (25)
all others   (375)
 
 
Source: Owen 1994 
 
Population Size and Growth Rate 
The estimated size of the minority ethnic population in 2000 was 4 million or 
7.1 per cent of the total population, compared with 3.1 million or 5.5 per cent 
of the total population in 1991. Approximately half of the total minority ethnic 
population is South Asian (Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi), while almost a 
third identify themselves as Black, Black-Caribbean, Black-African or Black-
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Other. Among South Asians the Indian population was approximately 
936,000 in 2000, representing the lowest growth rate, of 4 per cent, during the 
1990s (figure A.3). In contrast, the Pakistani population had grown from 
535,000 to 605,000 and the Bangladeshi population had increased from 183,000 
to 238,000 - growth rates of 13 per cent and 30 per cent respectively (ONS 
2001). 
 
Figure A.3: Population Estimates by Ethnic Group, Great Britain, 2000 
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Source: ONS 2001 
 
Age Structure and Sex Ratios 
Figure A.4 shows that the minority ethnic population is very young with a 
median age of 26 compared with a median age of 37 for the White population 
(ONS 2001). The age profile of the White population reveals a well rounded 
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population, where there is a rough parity between the sexes, even though as 
the population ages more women are present than men. The White majority 
population is a significantly mature population where the proportion of older 
people is steadily increasing. In contrast, minority ethnic groups are 
characterised by large numbers of young people and a dearth of elderly 
people. These differences are influenced by the timing of immigration mainly 
of young adults, with or without families, and differentials in fertility, with 
the Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups being the most fertile. 
 
Among South Asians, Indians were closest to the age profile of the White 
population with a median age of 31. The median age of the Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi population was 22 and 18 years of age and 34 per cent of the 
Pakistani population and 40 per cent of the Bangladeshi population were 
under 16.  
 
Clearly the two communities contain fast growing populations, which are 
entering marriageable age range faster than other minority ethnic groups. At 
the same time there are also differences between Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. 
Pakistanis have a larger cohort in the 15-29 age range while Bangladeshis 
have a greater presence in the 0-14 age range. This indicates that the Pakistani 
population is experiencing a demographic bulge of young people of 
marriageable age at present while Bangladeshis will experience this in the 
next five to ten years. 
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Figure A.4: Age structure of Minority Ethnic Groups 1997-99 
 
 
Source: ONS 2001 
 
Both the Bangladeshi and Pakistani populations show asymmetries in the sex 
ratio. Overall there are more Pakistani men than women with the largest 
imbalance in the 30-44 age range. However, the one exception lies in the 15-29 
age range where there are marginally fewer men than women. There is some 
ambiguity about these figures (see pages 30-32 for discussion of contra-factual 
evidence) and we will know with a greater degree of certainty when the 2001 
Census published. The Bangladeshi profile is far more irregular - it is more 
male dominated than either the Pakistani or Indian groups. The pattern has 
been skewed by two factors – (a) poverty has delayed marriage and (b) 
immigration legislation and administrative procedures have interfered with 
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migratory flows. The impact of these two factors is most marked in the 30-44 
age range where there are 150 men to 100 women (figure A.5). A third 
(perhaps weakening) factor shaping these asymmetries has been the tendency 
for Bangladeshi men to marry women younger than themselves. On average 
husbands are ten years older than their wives (ONS 2001, Peach 1996, Eade 
1996). In the white community marriage tends to take place between similar 
age ranges, although in the past men tended to be older than women. The 
traditional explanation for men being older when they marry is that they 
mature physically slowly more than women, are expected to be the principal 
earner and provide economic support for women, and may delay marriage in 
order to pursue higher education. As women engage with higher education 
and secure careers, the age gap has narrowed. The linkage between 
endogamous marriages and asymmetries in sex ratios is explored in chapter 3 
pp. 55. 
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Figure A.5: Sex Ratios and Percentages of People Born by Ethnic Group, 1997-99, Great Britain 
 
 
Black-
Caribbean 
Black-
African 
Black-
Other Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese 
Other 
Asian White Total 
Sex ratio (males per 100 females)         
           
0-14 98 110 113 108 104 117 86 94 105 105 
15-29 109 113 84 102 99 102 148 87 104 104 
30-44 74 94 96 109 117 150 77 90 103 102 
45+ 87 119 115 101 101 108 65 79 87 87 
           
All Ages 89 106 100 105 105 116 92 87 97 97 
           
Percentage born in the UK        Percentages  
           
0-14 95 70 98 95 93 87 81 67 98 97 
15-29 87 33 93 73 60 33 34 22 95 92 
30-44 65 15 83 14 14 5 6 4 95 90 
45-59 4 1 19 1 6 1 2 2 95 91 
60-74 1 4 15 1 9 0 1 0 95 92 
75+ 2 0 36 0 6 0 0 0 95 94 
           
All ages 57 35 89 43 53 45 25 21 96 93 
 
Source: ONS 2001 
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Employment, Unemployment and Self-employment 
Employment data (employed and jobseekers) indicate that Whites have a 
greater participation in the labour market than minority ethnic groups. 
Generally employment is lower for minority ethnic groups and the lowest 
rates are found among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. Women’s employment 
rates are far lower than men’s with only 30 per cent of Pakistani women and 
19 per cent of Bangladeshi women economically active compared with 57 per 
cent of Pakistani men and 54 per cent of Bangladeshi men. Minority ethnic 
group (see figure A.6) unemployment is more than double the rate of White 
unemployment. Heath argues that racial harassment and discrimination have 
impacted negatively on employment outcomes and provide a partial and 
important explanation for persistent disadvantage (Heath 2001: 128). 
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Figure A.6: Male Economic activity. Employment and ILO Unemployment 
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Source: cited in Policy Action Team 1999 
 
Employment and unemployment outcomes are exacerbated by economic 
downturn and regional variations, which affect minority ethnic groups more 
than Whites, and Pakistanis more than Bangladeshis as 63 per cent of the 
latter live in London. These figures do not take into account disguised 
employment of men and women in the informal economy (working ‘off the 
books’, that is casual employment and in some cases while claiming benefits, 
and home-working – particularly by women – manufacturing garments) and 
unemployment of women who may not be claiming benefit. 
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Figure A.7: Female Economic Activity. Employment and ILO Unemployment 
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Source: cited in Policy Action Team 1999  
 
The proportion of self-employment among minority ethnic groups is 
relatively high. 20 per cent of South Asian men are self-employed compared 
with 15 per cent of White men. South Asian female self-employment is similar 
to rates found among White women. Pakistani, Chinese and Indians have the 
highest rates of 25 per cent, 21 per cent and 19 per cent respectively. 
Bangladeshi self-employment was higher than the White average in 1998 but 
had fallen below this average by 2000. These higher rates are attributed to two 
factors (not necessarily mutually exclusive) - discrimination in employment 
restricting advancement and self-employment being seen as an alternative 
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strategy for advancement. Racial discrimination was a strong factor for 
Pakistanis going into self-employment. Another interpretation is that ethnic 
inclusion pulls minority ethnic groups to work in particular sectors of the 
economy as self-employed. Networks of kinship and friendship provide 
organisational and cultural resources – partnerships, credit, customers, 
market information etc. – giving advantage to ethnic entrepreneurs over 
White competition. (Owen 2000: pp. 76-7, Heath 2001: 49, Metcalf, Modood 
and Virdee: 68-9). 
 
Minority ethnic groups (figure A.8) are clustered mainly in manufacturing, 
distribution, hotels and restaurants, public administration, education and 
health and the financial sector, in that order. They have hardly any 
representation in agriculture and fishing and energy and water. Bangladeshis 
are over-represented in the distribution sector, which includes restaurants 
and hotels. 65 per cent of Bangladeshis are employed in this sector compared 
with 29 per cent of Pakistanis. A significant number of Pakistanis also find 
employment in manufacturing (21 per cent), transport and communication, 
which includes taxis and chauffeuring (14 per cent), public administration (17 
per cent) and the financial sector (13 per cent) (Owen et al. 2000: 77). The high 
rates of self-employment, particularly for Pakistanis, and clustering around 
certain sectors, especially for Bangladeshis, indicate that the process of 
exclusion is being addressed by exploiting bonding through social capital 
reinforcing kinship networks. 
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Figure A.8: Ethnic Breakdown of Employment by Industry: Percentages of all Employed and Self-employed 1997-1999. 
 
 
 
A-B: 
Agriculture 
and Fishing 
C, E:  
Energy & 
Water 
D: 
Manufacturing 
F:  
Construction 
G-H: 
Distribution, 
Hotels & 
Restaurants 
I:  
Transport & 
Communication 
J-K:  
Banking, 
Finance & 
Insurance, etc 
L-N: Public 
Admin, 
Education & 
Health 
O-Q:  
Other 
Services 
White 2 1 19 7 20 7 15 24 6 
Black-Caribbean  14 5 15 8 14 36 7 
Black-African  8  20 9 21 31 7 
Black-Other     22   35  
Indian   22 3 26 9 18 20 3 
Pakistani   21  29 14 13 17  
Bangladeshi     65     
Chinese     50  13 20  
Other Asian   12  30  16 27  
Other-other     29   29  
 
Source: D. Owen et al. 2000 
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Human Capital 
 
Human capital, i.e. such non-material assets as education and skills, has an 
impact on employment prospects. Education is the primary variable and, 
nationally, Chinese and Indians outperform Whites at GCSE, while Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis languish at the bottom with only African-Caribbeans doing 
worse. A gender breakdown shows that girls across the board do better than 
boys and this is most marked among Black girls. Pakistani and Bangladeshi 
girls do marginally better than boys (figure A.9).  
 
Figure A.9: Percentage of Examination Achievements in Year 11 by Ethnic 
Groups and Gender 
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Owen demonstrates that Bangladeshis are the most under-represented group 
in higher education and that Pakistani and Bangladeshi graduates have 
unemployment rates double that of their White counterparts. In spite of 
recent improvements in educational and training outcomes there is a 
considerable gap between these two groups, on the one hand, and the White 
population or more successful minority ethnic groups, on the other (2000: 
130).  
 
Heath argues that poor participation in the labour market can partly be 
explained by racial discrimination and partly by deficiencies in human 
capital. He considers class origins to be an important factor in understanding 
minority ethnic disadvantage in the labour market. Pakistanis and 
Bangladeshis are mainly from rural and petty bourgeois backgrounds and 
this limits their chances of entering the salariat. Cultural and religious factors 
may be determinant but are difficult to account for statistically. Even when a 
range of factors are accounted for, Pakistani and Bangladeshi unemployment 
is three times that of Hindus. Indian Muslims are strikingly different in their 
achievement rates from Pakistanis and Bangladeshis suggesting that religion 
is a proxy for specific group circumstances (Heath 2001: 80-1; Brown 2000). 
However, there are important local differences at work, shown in Chapter 2. 
 
Conclusion 
In common with most minority ethnic groups, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
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are primarily concentrated in the urban areas of England with only a small 
presence in Scotland and Wales. The main difference in spatial distribution 
between the two communities is that Bangladeshis are primarily located in 
London, while Pakistanis are concentrated in the West Midlands and the mill 
towns of Yorkshire and Lancashire. 
 
In terms of age structure both communities are young, with Bangladeshis 
having an even younger population than Pakistanis. Thus various socio-
economic issues that are confronting Pakistani young at present will be faced 
by Bangladeshis young in five to ten years time. This relates to a wide range 
of issues from education to employment and marriage. Both are primarily 
working class communities of rural origin. Male and female unemployment is 
high in both communities and the figures for youth unemployment are 
worryingly high. Racial discrimination and harassment is an important factor 
for these high rates. Due to racial exclusion and ethnic inclusion there are 
high rates of self-employment, particularly for Pakistanis, and sectorial 
concentrations for Bangladeshis. Both communities are vulnerable to 
economic downturn, regional variations and sectorial shifts. Human capital is 
low but increasing among the younger generation, mainly among girls. This 
has an important effect on their success in the labour market. The dependence 
on bonding social capital reinforces kin networks and makes them of greater 
strategic importance than might be expected. This in turn makes endogamous 
marriages an important cultural asset that can be translated into economic 
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advantage. 
 
